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FROM HIERARCHIES TO MARKETS: FEDEX DRIVERS AND THE WORK
CONTRACT AS INSTITUTIONAL MARKER
Julia Tomassetti *
Judges are often called upon today to determine whether certain
workers are “employees” or “independent contractors.” The distinction is important, because only employees have rights under
most statutes regulating work, including wage and hour and antidiscrimination law. Too often judges exclude workers from statutory protection who resemble what scholars have described as “typical” employees—long-term, full-time workers with set wages and
routinized responsibilities within a large firm. To explain how
courts reach these counterintuitive results, the article examines
recent decisions finding that FedEx delivery drivers are independent contractors rather than employees. The article finds that instability in the legal distinction between employees and independent
contractors is embedded within the employment contract itself, in
the law’s attempt to construe the legal relations of master and
servant as a “contract.” By merging contractual formation and
performance, this attempt creates two doctrinal ambiguities. By
manipulating these ambiguities, the courts transformed some of the
same vulnerabilities that place the drivers within the policy concerns of collective bargaining and wage and hour law into evidence of their autonomy. The courts also attempted to reconcile
the awkward fit of master-servant authority and contract by constructing the written contract that drivers sign as an institutional
marker of non-employment.
The attempt to encase master-servant authority in contract also
destabilizes distinctions between firms and markets. The FedEx
decisions marshal this instability to redefine a firm, as conceptualized by major economic theories of the firm, as a market. They
conflate the de-personality of bureaucracy with the impersonality
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of the market. The drivers’ fungibility as low-skilled workers performing standardized routines becomes evidence of their entrepreneurial opportunity, and the decisions submerged the FedEx bureaucracy beneath a nexus of contracts. The decisions reject theories of the firm that ground the legitimacy of the corporation in the
production of goods and services. While we ultimately require a
more radical transformation in work relations to prevent decision
makers from redefining servitude as equality, the article recommends two provisional suggestions to improve decision-making in
disputes over employment status.
INTRODUCTION
Most times when we receive a package delivery, whether it’s
from UPS, FedEx, or the Postal Service, it looks like the drivers
are pretty much doing the same work. We track the package online
or receive email updates regarding the delivery date. The doorbell
rings. Outside is a deliveryman, neatly groomed, in uniform, and
sporting an ID badge and the company logo. He is courteous as he
hands you the package and perhaps requests your signature. As he
turns to return to a recognizable truck, he says, “Have a nice day.”
You might find it difficult to believe that, according to FedEx,
its drivers are not employees, but independent contractors—even
entrepreneurs. You might also find it difficult to believe that the
employment status of FedEx drivers is a contested legal issue, and
has been for decades.
The distinction between employees and independent contractors is important, because only employees have rights under most
statutes regulating work, including wage and hour, antidiscrimination, and collective bargaining law. Only employers
have obligations under these laws, such as paying unemployment
insurance premiums or payroll taxes. 1
FedEx classifies about 16,000 package and delivery drivers
nationwide as independent contractors. Other drivers it classifies as

1 See Noah Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE
GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA’S LABOR
MARKET (Annette D Bernhardt, et al. eds., 2008); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM
WIDGETS TO DIGITS (2004).
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employees of its independent contractors and not of FedEx. 2 By
relying on these classifications, FedEx has frustrated drivers’ attempts to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) and to obtain relief under other law, including workers
compensation and wage and hour legislation. While the work of
UPS and FedEx drivers is nearly identical, the positions differ.
UPS drivers are unionized. They earn about $60,000 per year and
have health insurance and other benefits. FedEx drivers earn about
$25,000-$35,000 per year and have sparse benefits apart from annual vacation. 3
Today, countless employers are re-organizing work to avoid
the legal duties of an employment relationship. Many are recategorizing employees as independent contractors. Many are renouncing their legal identity as the “employer” of workers they
control through subcontractors, subsidiaries, or other intermediaries. 4 Disputes over employment status affect millions of workers
and arise across a wide spectrum of work—from manufacturing to
services, low skill to professional work, and the public to private
sector. 5 The re-organization of work costs state and federal treasur2 FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB (FHD), 563 F.3d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (4,000
FedEx Home division drivers); In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., No. 3:05-MD-527
RM, 2007 WL 3036891, at *2 (Oct. 12 2007) (12,000 FedEx Ground division drivers).
3 STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH TIMES FOR THE AMERICAN
WORKER 123 (2008). New York FedEx drivers earn about $750 per week, for sixty-hour
weeks and sparse benefits; UPS drivers earn about $1,400 per week and receive benefits.
Josh Kosman, Trucking Crazy! FedEx Guts Bill That Would Have Aided Drivers, N.Y.
POST, Aug. 8, 2013, at 22, available at http://nypost.com/2013/08/10/trucking-crazyfedex-guts-bill-that-would-have-aided-drivers.
4 See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014); Zatz, supra note _;
CATHERINE RUCKELSHUAS, REBECCA SMITH, SARAH LEBERSTEIN, & EUNICE CHO, NAT’L
EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, WHO’S THE BOSS (2014) [hereinafter WHO’S THE BOSS?];
LALITH DESILVA, ADRIAN MILLETT, DOMINIC ROTONDI, & WILLIAM SULLIVAN,
PLANMATICS, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS (2000) [hereinafter PLANMATICS] (one of few
studies with robust national data on extent of contingent employment). See also
CATHERINE K. RUCKELSHAUS, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, LEVELING THE
PLAYING FIELD: PROTECTING WORKERS AND BUSINESSES AFFECTED BY
MISCLASSIFICATION (2010) (employers can save over 30% on payroll costs by avoiding
taxes through worker misclassification). For some purposes, firms prefer to classify
workers as employees. Under the Copyright Act, only independent contractors by default
have intellectual property rights in their creative works. See Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989). Also, workers compensation insurance
does not cover injuries to independent contractors, putting firms at risk of tort liability.
See, e.g., Carr v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 733 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
5 See, e.g., DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014).
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ies billions in tax revenue. It costs workers billions in wage theft
and is a means by which firms drive down industry wages. 6 The
questions “who is an employee”?” and “who is an employer” have
assumed global significance, particularly in places that tie social
insurance and civil rights to employment. 7
FedEx has litigated its drivers’ employment status since the
late 1980s. 8 Several dozen lawsuits are pending today, including
class actions from over thirty states. 9 FedEx expends substantial
resources litigating drivers’ employment status, because the viability of its business model depends on avoiding the work law obligations faced by its main competitor, the unionized UPS. 10 While
most courts and agencies are finding the drivers to be employees, 11
6 WHO’S THE BOSS; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONTINGENT WORKERS:
INCOMES AND BENEFITS LAG BEHIND THOSE OF REST OF WORKFORCE (2000).
7 See, e.g., RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND THE STANDARD
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT (Katherine V. W. Stone and H. W. Arthurs eds., 2013); THE
IDEA OF LABOUR LAW (Guy Davidov and Brian Langille eds., 2011).
8 See, e.g., Roadway Package System, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (1989). See also Jeffrey
M. Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur? 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353 (2011); Micah P. S.
Jost, Independent Contractors, Employees, and Entrepreneurialism Under the National
Labor Relations Act: A Worker-by-Worker Approach, 68 WASH & LEE L. REV. 311
(2011); Jamison F. Grella, From Corporate Express to FedEx Home Delivery: A New
Hurdle for Employees Seeking the Protections of the National Labor Relations Act in the
D.C. Circuit, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 877 (2009); Todd D. Saveland, FedEx’s New Employees: Their Disgruntled Independent Contractors, 36 TRANSP. L.J. 95
(2009).
9 Anna Kwidzinski, Ninth Cir. Says FedEx Drivers in Two States Are Employees,
Not Independent Contractors, Aug. 28, 2014, 12 WLR 1443 [BNA]; GREENHOUSE, supra note _, at 123.
10 Anya Litvak, FedEx Ground Makes Change to Independent Contractor Model,
PITTSBURGH
BUS.
TIMES,
June
10,
2010,
http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2010/ 06/14/story4.html?page=all; FedEx’s air-freight division classifies its workers as employees; however, in 1996 the company successfully lobbied Congress (including by giving many Congresspersons rides in
its jets) to put its drivers under the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) rather
than the NLRA, which would require all 40,000 drivers dispersed across the country to
organize in one national unit, making it very difficult to organize a union. GREENHOUSE,
supra note _, at 122; Neil A. Lewis, A Lobby Effort That Delivers The Big Votes; Federal
Express Knows Its Way Around Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1996, available at 1996
WLNR 4407778. By one estimate, FedEx has saved up to $400 million per year by classifying its drivers as independent contractors. GREENHOUSE, supra note _.
11 See, e.g., In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 10–3115, 2015 WL
4099853 (7th Cir. July 8, 2015); Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., 787
F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015); Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981 (9th
Cir. 2014); Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2014);
Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006 *9, 17 (E.D. Mo. 2013);
Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., No. 11–11094–RGS, 2013 WL 3353776 (D.

(continued next page)
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important decisions deeming the drivers to be independent contractors still stand.12
Most statutes and administrative guidelines fail to define employee or employer in any helpful matter. 13 This has left the issue
of employment status largely in the hands of adjudicators, 14 on the
courts and the National Labor Relations Board, the agency that enforces the NLRA. Judges apply common law standards and make
decisions on a case-by-case basis. The resulting case law is notoriously inconsistent as to who is, and who is not, in an employment
relationship. 15 Further, judges have excluded many workers from
statutory protection who fit squarely within the policy concerns of
the law. 16
Mass. July 3, 2013), overturned in part, 2015 WL 501512 (2015); Estrada v. FedEx
Ground, No. BC 210310, 2004 WL 5631425 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 26, 2004), aff’d, Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Ct. App. 2007); Craig v. FedEx
Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66 (Kan. 2014); FedEx Home Delivery, 361
N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198 (2014).
12 FHD, 563 F.3d 492; In re FedEx Ground Package Sys. (Kansas decision), 734
F.Supp.2d 557 (N.D. Ind. 2010), rev’d, In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 10–
3115 2015 WL 4099853 (7th Cir. July 8, 2015); In re FedEx Ground Package Sys. (Multi-state decision), 758 F.Supp.2d 638 (N.D. Ind. 2010), rev’d in part, Alexander v. FedEx
Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014), Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys., 765 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2014), and Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Systems,
Inc., 787 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015).
13 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (defining “employee” for purposes of employee
benefit
plans). See also Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It
Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295
(2001).
14 Hereafter, “judges” refers to adjudicators on administrative agencies and courts.
15 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees with Employers, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 260 (2006); Carlson, supra note _, at 298–301, 338.
16 See, e.g., SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION IMPOSES HUGE COSTS ON WORKERS AND FEDERAL AND
STATE TREASURIES (2012) (summarizing twenty state-level studies of scope and costs of
independent contractor misclassification); U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION: IMPROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND TARGETING
COULD BETTER ENSURE DETECTION AND PREVENTION (2009); AMERICAN RIGHTS AT
WORK, THE HAVES AND THE HAVE-NOTS: HOW AMERICAN LABOR LAW DENIES A
QUARTER OF THE WORKFORCE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS (2008); EMPLOYMENT
DEV. DEP'T, STATE OF CAL., ANNUAL REPORT: FRAUD DETERRENCE AND DETECTION
ACTIVITIES (2008), available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf_pub_ctr/report2008.pdf; JOHN
PETRO, DRUM MAJOR INSTITUTE, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE: HOW THE MISCLASSIFICATION
OF TRUCK DRIVERS HURTS WORKERS, JOB QUALITY, AND NEW YORK STATE (2012);
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, JOINT TASK FORCE ON THE UNDERGROUND
ECONOMY AND EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION, ANNUAL REPORT (2010).
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Two federal courts recently upheld FedEx’s labeling of its delivery drivers as independent contractors. 17 The first was the D.C.
Circuit, the most powerful appellate court in the United States. In
2009, in the case of FedEx Home Delivery (FHD) it granted summary judgment to FedEx, finding that drivers who had voted to
unionize had no right to do so, because they were not employees. 18
The other is a district court in Indiana, where class actions by FedEx drivers from over 30 states were consolidated in historic, multidistrict litigation. The drivers were suing FedEx primarily for
fraud, wage and hour violations, and workers compensation. 19 The
multi-district decisions on the drivers’ employment status have
been overturned in a few states (by every court that has reviewed
them thus far), 20 but FHD remains intact. 21
The central question of this paper is, how was it possible for
courts finding the drivers to be independent contractors to reach
these counterintuitive results? By examining this question, the paper penetrates broader questions about the legal identity of employment: what accounts for the well-known inconsistency in the
case law on employment status? How are judges able to find that
workers who are clearly within the policy scope of workplace
regulation are excluded as independent contractors? How do judges transform what scholars have described as “standard” employment into “independent entrepreneurialism”? The paper does not
offer a doctrinal solution to the question of employment status. Rather, it offers a new theory of what allows judges to reach inconsistent and policy-defeating results in the first instance.

17

FHD, 563 F.3d 492; Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557; Multi-state decision,
758 F.Supp.2d 638.
18 FHD, 563 F.3d 492.
19 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557; Multi-state decision, 758 F.Supp.2d 638.
20

The Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits (the latter following the Kansas Supreme Court) reversed Judge Miller’s Kansas decision and Multi-state decision for drivers in their jurisdictions. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 10–3115, 2015 WL
4099853 (7th Cir. July 8, 2015); Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981
(9th Cir. 2014); Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2014);
Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., 787 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015); Craig v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66 (Kan. 2014).
21 A broad regime of federal preemption in labor law makes FHD all the more important.
See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527, 1530-31, 1569-79 (2002) (discussing federal preemption of labor law).
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The problem is more deep-seated than others have surmised.
Other legal scholars tend to attribute inconsistency and statutory
exclusion in the case law to a decline in industrial work since the
1970s or to imprecision in the legal tests for employment status.
Neither of these accounts can explain the FedEx cases: the drivers
resemble what scholars and judges have referred to as “standard”
or “industrial” employees—fulltime, long-term workers with set
wages and pre-defined, routinized duties within a large firm. 22 Further, many of the features that are evidence of employment status
under the legal tests are present in the drivers’ relationship. Where
judges disagree is on their legal meaning.
This paper shows that instability in the legal distinction between employment and non-employment is rooted in the employment contract itself, in its attempt to construe the legal relations of
master and servant as a “contract.” The attempt to fit employment
in the framework of contract creates two doctrinal ambiguities that
make the dominant standard for distinguishing employment from
independent contracting relationships—the means-end standard—
irresolvable.
The means-ends standard looks to the extent of the alleged employer’s right to control the work. An employer has a right to control the “means” of the work, not only the “ends” of the work. The
major tests for employment status ask judges to consider a long,
open-ended list of factors to determine whether the alleged employer controls the means of the work, like the extent of supervision and whether the alleged employer has a right to assign daily
work. 23
The fusion of master-servant authority and contract make the
means-end question irresolvable by blurring contractual formation
and performance. Parties to an employment relationship do not
consummate a contractual bargain through an exchange of promises, or through an exchange of a promise for performance, and later
move onto the business of carrying out the agreement. Employment entails a continuing renewal of offer and acceptance through
an exchange of performances.
First, the employment contract makes ambiguous the activities
of bargaining over the work and carrying out the work, or produc22
23

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.A.
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ing. Employee and employer bargain as they produce goods or services: the employer bargains over the terms of work by directing
the work, and the employee accepts these contractual offers by following the employer’s direction each moment the employee works
without quitting. The means-ends standard, however, depends on
being able to distinguish when the parties are bargaining from
when they are producing. It may look like one party is controlling
the work, for example, but if the parties are still negotiating, then
one party may be getting its way by driving a hard bargain, not because it is an employer. The employment contract in practice
merges independence in negotiating the “ends” of the work with
obedience in producing, the “means” of the work.
The second ambiguity surfaces in attempts to interpret a written work agreement in disputes over employment status, rather
than in distinguishing the activities of bargaining from producing.
It is the ambiguity between contractual duties and the manner of
performing them. The means-ends standard depicts employment as
a contract, but a special kind of contract—it gives one party a right
to determine how the other party carries out its contractual obligations. In other contracts, the parties commit one another only to the
“ends” of the deal; neither has a right to dictate how the other party
satisfies these ends. The employment contract, however, gives one
this right: the employer has a right to control the “means” of the
work. The means-ends standard depends on being able to distinguish between contractual duties and the manner of their performance, in order to evaluate whether one party is controlling the
latter or only the former. The problem is, again, that the fusion of
master-servant authority with contract makes the distinction illusory. The employer and employee determine “contractual” duties as
they produce.
This conundrum puts a written agreement in an ambiguous position in employment status disputes. Courts disagree as to what
extent, if at all, the alleged employer controls its workers when it
relies on a written contract to direct the work: Does any term appearing in a written agreement, by virtue of its expression in something labeled an “agreement” or “contract,” state a contractual end?
If the alleged employer is not telling workers to do anything not in
the contract, is it not controlling the work? By contrast, might
some provisions of the contract describe how contractual ends are
to be performed?
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Using the decisions finding FedEx drivers to be independent
contractors (the “IC decisions”), this paper shows that the attempt
to fuse master-servant authority and contract enables courts to
transform employees into entrepreneurs. The IC decisions marshaled the doctrinal ambiguities embedded within the employment
contract to redefine nearly all of the factors probative of employment status under the legal tests as evidence consistent with, if not
evidence of, independent contracting. They engaged the ambiguities to transform features of the drivers’ work that were typical of
industrial employment into evidence of entrepreneurial opportunity. In the IC decisions, delivery route assignments, daily package
assignments, supervision, discipline, promotions, shift replacements, training, the unskilled nature of the work, job duration, quasi-at-will authority, schedule controls, and work rules involving
driving, appearance, customer interaction, and package handling
became either irrelevant to the drivers’ employment status or affirmative evidence that the drivers were independent businesspersons.
The FedEx disputes not only reveal the law’s role in destabilizing the conventional boundaries of work relations, but also in reconstituting them. As part of the employment contract itself, the
ambiguities between bargaining and producing, and between contractual duties and their performance, permit no doctrinal resolution. Stability in the legal identity of contemporary work relations
depends on how we institutionalize them.
To institutionalize something is to construct it as a pattern of
organizations, activities, norms, roles, and media. 24 This pattern is
historically specific, but tends to be durable and taken-for-granted.
The elements of this pattern are institutional markers, features that
signal a relationship is of one particular type and not another. 25
The law plays a special role in institutionalization. Judges look
to what are ostensibly extra-legal data points to impart meaning to
legal categories, and organizations adjust their practices to mimic
legal categories. Organizational practice provides the doctrinal categories with content that makes them recognizable, and meaning24

See VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005).
See also Noah Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. R. 857 (2008) [hereinafter Zatz, Working at the Boundaries].
25
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ful, as social relations. At the same time, the law confers legitimacy on organizational practices when it recognizes them as valid
legal categories. 26
While the tension within employment between master-servant
authority and contract has always been there, it surfaces in times of
institutional disruption. The dominant institutional résumé of employment in the 20th century, in terms of political and cultural salience, was industrial employment. Employment was a long-term,
full-time, direct relationship between a large firm and a worker
with set wages and pre-defined duties. The institution of industrial
employment submerged, for a time and in certain places, the contradictory complex of servitude and equality that defines employment. It did not resolve it. Today, the growing service sector, revolutions in logistics and communications technology, financialization, and other developments are disrupting the institutional order
of industrial work. As courts contend with the doctrinal manifestations of this disruption, they also work to re-institutionalize employment.
The IC decisions seek to re-institutionalize what looks much
like industrial employment—a direct, full-time, long-term relationship between a worker and a large firm—as one of independent
entrepreneurialism. The paper explores two ways in which the decisions construct the drivers’ written work agreement with FedEx
as an institutional marker of non-employment.
As they re-institutionalize contemporary work relations, judges
also redefine the institutional contours of firms and markets. The
paper draws on economic theory regarding the institutional structures for directing and coordinating resources in production. Firm
theorists, like Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, 27 have attempted to explain why firms exist as an alternative to markets for
organizing production, and to account for their bordering. The familiar iteration of the question is, “what determines whether a firm
‘makes’ an input to production or instead ‘buys’ an input to pro26 Lauren Edelman, et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. OF SOC. 888 (2011).
27 E.g., Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Oliver
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22
J. L. & Econ. 233 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson, Governance]; Oliver Williamson, The
Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 Am. J. Soc. 548 (1981)
[hereinafter Williamson, Economics].
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duction?” Economic theories of the firm tend to associate firms
and markets with different legal relations: market transactions with
contract and firm transactions with property rights or employment. 28 Theories of the firm have even suggested that employment
and independent contracting are homologous with firms and markets. 29
Due to the close relationship between employment and sociolegal conceptions of the business form, the law’s attempt to construe employment as a contract tends to destabilize boundaries between firms and markets just as it destabilizes boundaries between
employment and non-employment. In the IC decisions, the ambiguity between bargaining and producing in employment reappears
as a tension within the firm: employment as a contract is a direct
and bilateral relationship between putatively equal parties; however, employment is also a legal rationale for a firm’s centralized
control over indirect, hierarchical, and multilateral relations in production. The contradiction between master-servant authority and
contract enabled FedEx and the courts to submerge the consummate firm—the Weberian bureaucracy—beneath a nexus of contracts.
Despite the indeterminacy of the legal tests for employment
status, the IC decisions are troubling for reasons of doctrine, policy, and political legitimacy. First, they ignore—and thus answer
incorrectly—what is arguably the underlying query in a dispute
over whether a work relationship is employment or independent
contracting: is the relationship more like a contract or more like a
master-servant relationship? Secondly, in ignoring this question,
the IC decisions thwart the policy concerns of the law with protecting persons who sell their ability to work to make a living. The decisions transform some of the same vulnerabilities that place the
drivers within the policy concerns of minimum wage and collective bargaining law into evidence of their autonomy! The more the
workers appear as interchangeable cogs in a machine, the more
they look like independent entrepreneurs in the courts’ reasoning.
The decisions conflate the depersonality of bureaucracy with the
impersonality of the market. Third, the IC decisions redefine the
28
29

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
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normative relationship between the corporate form and the productive enterprise.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the legal
tests for employment status and examines the primary explanations
for instability in the legal identity of employment in the case law.
Part II is the theoretical core of the argument. It shows that the
law’s attempt to render employment a contract produces two doctrinal ambiguities in employment status disputes. Part III illustrates
the first doctrinal ambiguity at work. It shows how the IC decisions
drew on the ambiguity between bargaining and producing to reinterpret traditional institutional markers of employment and construct the written document drivers sign as an institutional marker
of non-employment. It also shows that their interpretation formed
an axis of disagreement among courts considering the employment
status of FedEx drivers. Part III also critiques how the IC decisions
resolved the ambiguity on doctrinal and policy grounds. Part IV
discusses the relationship between employment and economic theories of the firm. It shows that the law’s attempt to fit employment
in the legal framework of contract destabilizes classic conceptions
of firms and markets. It also shows that, in transforming the FedEx
drivers into independent contractors, the IC decisions transform a
firm, as conceptualized by major theories of the firm, into a market. They likewise conceal a highly rational bureaucracy under a
nexus of contracts. Part IV critiques the IC decisions for thwarting
the policy objectives of work law and hollowing out the normative
basis of the business form. Part V illustrates the second ambiguity
created by the fusion of master-servant authority and contract in
the IC decisions. It analyzes and critiques the courts’ institutional
work to construct the written document signed by drivers as a
marker of non-employment.
The conclusion suggests two provisional strategies to improve
decision-making in disputes over employment status. The first is in
the judicial repertoire: use contract law to evaluate whether the
disputed work arrangement is more like a contract or more like a
master-servant relationship. The second proposal is to use classic
theories of the firm to distinguish between entrepreneurial opportunity—opportunity conferred by the market—and an employee’s
opportunity within a firm.
Nonetheless, because legal ambiguity in contemporary work
relations is based on a contradiction at the heart of the employment
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contract—a contradiction between contractual equality and servitude—the article concludes that doctrinal adjustments will not resolve the problem. Only a radical transformation in work relations
will stabilize the legal identity of work relations and prevent decision-makers from redefining relations of subordination as relations
of equality.
I. EMPLOYMENT STATUS
A. The Legal Tests
The definition of the employment contract is working for another, under the other’s right of control. 30 The dominant expression
of this definition as a legal standard is the means-ends standard.
Courts ask, does the alleged employer control only the “ends” of
the work or does it also control the “means” of the work? 31
Most statutes do not include their own definition of employment, so courts and agencies are largely responsible for constructing the employment relationship out of this definition and standard.
Almost all of the tests for employment status under state, federal,
and local law are variations of two, overlapping tests: the common
law master-servant agency test 32 and the economic realities test. 33
30

E.g., Kelley v. S. Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974).
Local 777 1978, 897, quoting Party Cab 1949, 92.
32 The federal agency test governs claims under ERISA, the NLRA, Title VII, ADA,
ADEA, OSHA, the Copyright Act, and whenever a statute does not provide a constructive definition of employment. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992);
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc.s v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
33 The economic realities test governs cases under the FLSA, Migrant Workers and
Agricultural Workers Protection Act (MWAWPA), Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA),
and many state wage and hour laws. The economic realities test includes many agency
test factors. The central differences are that the former asks whether the worker is “economically dependent” on the alleged employer and allows courts to consider statutory
purpose. Cf. Darden, 503 U.S. 318; NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S.
85, 91–92 (1995). The Supreme Court intended the test to be broader than the agency
test. Darden, 503 U.S. at _; Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 725;
Hearst, 322 U.S. at 127; Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2003).
See also Bruce Goldstein, et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV.
983 (1998); Marc Linder, Towards Universal Worker Coverage under the National Labor Relations Act: Making Room for Uncontrolled Employees, Dependent Contractors,
and Employee-Like Persons, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 555 (1988). Whether in practice courts
interpret employment more broadly under the economic realities test is subject to dispute.
31

(continued next page)
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Under the federal tests, and under most state versions, judges
consider an open-ended list of indicia as evidence bearing on the
control question or as secondary evidence of employment status.
The Restatement (2nd) of Agency, an influential secondary summary of the common law, lists several factors:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person
doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the
job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business
of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 34
Additional factors that judges tend to consider include whether
the worker works exclusively for the alleged employer or also services other clients; whether the worker conducts business in its
own name; whether the work presents opportunities for entrepreneurial gain and loss; the extent of supervision; whether the alleged
employer provides training; whether the worker is subject to discipline; whether the worker has the right to quit; whether the alleged
employer can terminate the worker; whether the worker can turn
Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors, supra note _; Benjamin F. Burry, Testing Economic Reality: FLSA and Title VII Protection for Workfare Participants, 2009
Univ. Chic. Leg. Forum 561 (2009); J.F. Harris, Worker Unity and the Law: A Comparative Analysis of the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
the Hope for the NLRA’s Future, 13 N.Y. City L. Rev. 107 (2009).
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
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down assignments and whether the alleged employer can assign
additional assignments; and whether the alleged employer assigns
daily work. Courts also consider whether the alleged employer
provides benefits or withholds payroll taxes. 35
B. Other Explanations
There are two primary explanations for why “the law can’t tell
an employee when it sees one” 36: imprecision in the legal tests for
employment and a decline in industrial employment.
1. Decline of Standard, Industrial Employment
One explanation for the widespread disagreement among judges regarding the identity of employment is the disappearance of
industrial work models around which the legal standards for employment status were conceived. The industrial model of work, or
Fordism, involved a long-term, direct relationship between a worker with routinized responsibilities and a hierarchical, vertically integrated firm. The firm produced and traded in its own name and
paid a family wage. 37 Scholars suggest that, because the law was
modeled on this “standard” employment relationship, it has difficulty apprehending post-industrial work. Many post-industrial relationships, like temporary agency work, part-time work, subcontracting, and networked production, are not characterized by the
long-term, direct attachment of an employee to a single firm. 38 The
argument is that work is changing, but the law is not.

35 E.g., Darden, 503 U.S. at 323; Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730, 751-52; Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
36 Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One
and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 295 (2001).
37 See Antonio Gramsci, Americanism and Fordism, in PRISON NOTEBOOKS 286
(1971); STONE, WIDGETS, supra note _. Fordism also refers to a post-WWII regime of
accumulation, or the particular relationship between production and consumption that
was possible because many large industrial firms paid a family or living wage. The eponym of “Fordism” is Henry Ford, who famously introduced the $5 wage so that every
Ford Motor worker could afford to purchase a Ford automobile.
38 STONE, WIDGETS, supra note _.
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2. Legal Imprecision
Another explanation for the inability of judges to agree on employment status is imprecision in the legal tests. 39 For purposes of
most statutes regulating employment, judges must consider a long,
non-exclusive list of factors to determine employment status.
Courts disagree on how many are necessary and which ones in
what combinations are the most important. Standards that define
employment by open-ended enumeration necessarily lead to inconsistent results like reading tealeaves. Further, the means-end standard is amenable to nearly infinite manipulation. Courts can always
find some residual discretion left to the putative contractor, and
they can describe the “ends” at the level of detail necessary for the
employer to maintain complete control. 40
3. A Challenge
The FedEx disputes challenge these explanations. The drivers’
work relationship fits what scholars have referred to as standard,
industrial employment—a long-term, full-time, direct relationship
between a worker and large firm that trades and produces under a
coherent business identity. The drivers have routinized responsibilities in an integrated production process, and they work under hierarchical, centralized management. Drivers must work 9 or 9.5 to
11 hours of work per day, five-days a week. Drivers must wear
uniforms and punch in and out of work. They are subject to a system of supervision, performance evaluation, and discipline, all of
which managers document in personnel files. They receive annual
vacation, and performance bonuses. Most drivers work for FedEx
for many years.
Almost all of the other features that are evidence of employment status under the legal tests are also present in the drivers’ relationship: FedEx provides all of the tools of work, with the excep39

E.g., id. (arguing that no factor on its own is reliable evidence of employment).
One judge parodied the means-ends inquiry as follows: “Thus laborers are employed to empty a carload of coal. The employer insists that he does not control them,
that he did not hire their ‘services’ but only contracted for the ‘result,’ an empty car. The
means of unloading, he says, are their own, i.e., they can shovel right-handed or lefthanded, start at one end of the car or the other.” Powell v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Employment Sec. Commission, 345 Mich. 455, 472 (1956) (dissent) (internal citations omitted).
40
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tion of the trucks, which drivers must purchase. FedEx decides
which trucks are acceptable and their specifications, down to the
shelving dimensions and material and acceptable brands of white
paint. FedEx restricts drivers’ ability to use the trucks for nonwork purposes. The work is unskilled, and FedEx trains drivers in
its service procedures. The work is part of FedEx’s regular and
core business. Drivers’ pay is based primarily on the hours they
work. FedEx assigns mandatory tasks on a daily basis. Drivers
must follow extensive rules on driving, personal appearance, vehicle appearance, handling packages, and interacting with FedEx
customers. Drivers have one customer—they sell their delivery
services only to FedEx. Drivers who perform exactly the same
work (FedEx drivers employed by a temp agency) 41 or very similar
work are employees. The latter include drivers for FedEx’s main
competitors, UPS and DHS, and drivers for the company division
FedEx Express.
Based on the main accounts for instability in the legal identity
of employment, FedEx drivers should not be a hard case. However,
the different case outcomes are not a product of disagreement regarding how to count, weigh, and balance a bevy of pro and con
features under the legal tests. The D.C. Circuit and Judge Miller
acknowledged that many factors probative of employment under
the governing tests were present. They reinterpreted this evidence
as evidence consistent with, or evidence of, non-employment.
II. CONSTRUING MASTER-SERVANT AUTHORITY AS “CONTRACT”
A. History of the Employment Contract
The employment contract—working for another under the right
of control of the other—is a product of the 19th century combination of the legal relationship between master and servant with the
legal relationship of contract. Judges and treatise writers reconfig41 In some of the FedEx cases, drivers could choose to become FedEx drivers as the
formal employees of a temp agency that contracted with FedEx rather than as a FedEx
contractor. Drivers underwent the same training and performed the same work whether
hired as contractors or temporary employees. FedEx Home Delivery, Nos. 1-RC-22034,
1-RC-22035, 2006 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 264 at 20, 25, 40, 53-54 (Sept. 20,
2006), vacated, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009). [hereinafter FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006].
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ured the master’s property-like right to the servant’s labor services
as a right based in contract, a doctrine enabling parties to reach enforceable agreements in commodity exchanges. As they transferred
the legal rationale for subordination to contract, courts expanded
master-servant authority to cover a wide range of work relationships in which workers were not previously subject to this authority. With the development of larger-scale production, judges expanded master-servant agency authority to cover not just the right
to direct a single worker or group of workers in a shop, but to justify managerial coordination and direction of the enterprise. 42
Karl Marx suggested that, in the remarkable creation of value
that occurred through the capitalist’s purchase of labor power and
the process of converting labor power into labor, the “laws that
regulate the exchange of commodities have been in no way violated.” 43 He was, perhaps, too cavalier. Employment is not a contract,
and the attempt to fit employment in the legal framework of contract produces intractable problems of interpretation.
B. Fitting Employment into Contract
1. The Problem of Consideration
To see why it is so difficult to construe employment as a contract, first, take the issue of at-will employment, and the contractual requirements of consideration and mutual assent. Recall that the
definition of employment is an agreement to work for another, under the other’s right of control. By default, employment is atwill. 44 Subject to limited exceptions, either party may terminate the
relationship at any time, for a good reason, bad reason, or no rea-

42

CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (1993); ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870
(1991).
43 KARL MARX, CAPITAL, in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 452, 505 (2d ed., David McClellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (1867).
44 As contractual defaults go, the at-will default is particularly stubborn. Even when
evidence discloses clear party intent to contract out of the at-will default, courts tend to
be resistant to enforcing the term or permanent employment contracts. See e.g., Asmus v.
Pacific Bell, 999 P.2d 71 (Cal. 2000).
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son. 45 Enforceable contracts generally require consideration—a
bargained for promise or performance in return for a promise. The
option of the return promise is unavailable in at-will employment:
the employee agrees follow the employer’s commands so long as
she feels like it. The employer agrees to provide work in exchange
for pay so long as she feels like it. This is a quintessential case of
illusory consideration. Neither party commits with a promise. 46
Therefore, the employee provides consideration through performance. The employee “assents” to the employer’s “offer” of
work by following the employer’s directions in the course of the
work. Likewise, the employer makes a contractual offer by directing the employee in the work. If employment is a contract, it involves a continuing renewal of offer and acceptance at each moment the employee works under the employer’s direction. 47 The
employee bargains over the terms and conditions of work by satisfactorily following the employer’s instructions. The employer bargains as it directs the work, for instance, now telling the employee
to work faster, now to perform additional work, now to stay late.
Thus, in employment, the parties bargain and perform their deal at
the same time. Employment is not a unilateral contract, however,
in which one provides consideration for the promise through performance. Both employee and employer exchange performances,

45 The only limits on the employer’s authority to terminate an employee are the
carve-outs provided by statute and a handful of judicially created public policy exceptions. Statutory exceptions include, for instance, the prohibition in Title VII against terminating employees on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, or gender. Public
policy exceptions often restrict employers for terminating employees who refuse to
commit perjury or who miss work for jury duty. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Dismissal
Law in the United States: The Past and Present of At-Will Employment, in
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE ON SOCIAL EUROPE (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1342667.
46 C.f. Petroleum Refractionating Corp. v. Kendrick Oil Co., 65 F.2d 997, 999 (10th
Cir. 1933).
47 See also JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 285 (1924)
(“The labor contract is therefore not a contract, it is a continuing implied renewal of contracts at every minute and every hour, based on the continuance of what is deemed, on the
employer’s side, to be satisfactory service, and, on the laborer’s side, what is deemed to
be satisfactory conditions and compensation”; Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777
(1972).
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not a promise for a performance. They bargain and they produce at
the same time. 48
To further understand, consider that, by definition, the employee does not provide labor for pay through employment: employment is an agreement to work for another, to provide labor effort.
(An agreement to exchange consummated work, labor, is an independent contracting agreement.) Based on the very nature of labor
effort and the contractual requirement of assent, the parties cannot
use contract to exchange labor effort: An employer cannot direct
the employee’s labor effort without the latter’s ongoing assent. 49
This is why a lease theory of employment does not ease the fit of
employment in the Procrustean bed of contract. Hiring an employee in some ways looks like renting an asset capable of producing
value—the employer leases the worker’s ability to labor. A lessee
has a property right in the leased goods to use and control them, to
extract as much value out of them as possible. However, the employer cannot squeeze anything out of the employee—it cannot put
in motion the capacity to produce value that it has leased—without
the latter’s simultaneous engagement of her will. The use and control of this value-producing asset requires that the employee continuously renew her contractual assent. The father of institutional
economics, John Commons remarked, “His [the worker’s] bargaining is his act of producing something for the employer and his producing something acceptable is his method of bargaining.” The
“laborer is thus continuously on the labor market—even while he
is working at his job he is both producing and bargaining, and the
two are inseparable.” 50
The problem is, we cannot distinguish the employment relationship from the independent contracting relationship unless we
can distinguish when the parties are bargaining from when they are
producing. The means-ends standard depends on the ability to recognize when the parties are on the “market” and when they are in
the abode of production: The right to contract over the terms and
48 The 13th Amendment prohibition on involuntary servitude is likely an obstacle to
exchanging labor effort as a contractual commodity. In the 19th century, judges began to
find that indentured servitude could be “involuntary,” even if the servant initially agreed
to the arrangement voluntarily. STEINFELD, supra note _, at 144-145.
49 If we could alienate the capacity to will, we would not have the capacity to contract.
50 COMMONS, supra note _, at 285.

DRAFT—DO NOT CITE

8/12/2015]

From Hierarchies to Markets

21

conditions of the labor services is a feature of both employment
and independent contracting. What distinguishes employment is
whether there is control over production. The employer controls
the “means and manner” of the work, not just the “ends” of the
work, over which all parties have a right to drive hard bargains.
Since contracting and producing are simultaneous in employment,
however, employer and employee never conclude a contractual
negotiation and proceed to a discrete activity of producing. In employment, contractual formation regarding the “ends” of the work
is simultaneous to producing—the “means” of the work or contractual performance. Independence in contracting is simultaneously
subordination in production.
2. The Problem of Indefiniteness
Regardless of whether the employment is at-will, the promise
as consideration option is generally unavailable in employment,
because it would tend to create contracts too indefinite to enforce.
Further, to save some contracts from indefiniteness and to police
the conduct of the parties, courts will imply contractual terms or
use other gap-fillers. They do not do so when interpreting employment agreements.
Again, by definition, the employee agrees to obey the employer’s instructions; however, these instructions will often determine
essential parts of the bargain. 51 In particular, employment lacks a
quantity term—the employee agrees to place his or her energies
under the employer’s right of control, and the employer promises a
certain payment. 52 The exchange is for an indefinite amount of labor for a definite amount of payment. How much labor the employee provides is determined in the course of production. The
employer seeks to convert the employee’s capacities into as much
51

Promises to obey one party's reasonable instructions when these promises would
not give one party the right to determine something as important as the quantity term tend
to be acceptable. For instance, a bailor may agree to follow the bailee’s reasonable instructions about how to handle its property, or a seller might promise to follow a buyer’s
reasonable directions regarding delivery.
52 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (2012) (requiring quantity term in contracts); see
also id. § 2-306 cmts. 1–3 (requiring good faith when conforming to quantity estimates);
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95 (1989) (discussing UCC default rules for filling in
price and quantity terms).
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completed work as possible; the employee seeks to regulate this
intensity. Critical terms of the conversion tend to go specified:
How hard should the employee work? How fast? With what rights
to object? 53 Employment resembles the unenforceable “agreement
to agree.” 54
Employees and employers can bargain about many features of
the relationship, and they may seek to limit the employer’s otherwise nearly unlimited right to dispose of the employee’s capacities.
With limited exceptions, provided mainly by statute, the terms are
unenforceable. Rather than rights to damages or equitable relief,
the parties have the right to exit the relationship.
While all contracts are incomplete, employment is incomplete
by design. Outside bodies, like courts or arbitrators, have authority
to interpret non-employment contracts. Contract law has a repertoire of interpretive principles and standardized terms to fill contractual gaps and ambiguities. 55 Their content may be based on, for
example, industry standards, a course of dealing or performance
between the parties, or relevant statute. Further, the courts imply a
covenant of good faith in other contracts. In a non-employment
contract, the parties may agree that one party will have discretion
to interpret contractual terms and fill certain gaps; however, courts
or arbitrators determine whether the interpretation is consistent
with the parties’ intent and not an abuse of discretion. 56
By contrast, when courts and treatise writers incorporated master-servant status into contracts for labor services, they gave the
employer an implied authority to determine unspecified or ambiguous elements of the agreement. 57 Employers are generally not
53

SELZNICK 134-35; ALAN FOX, BEYOND CONTRACT 183-84 (1974); JAMES B.
ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 11-15 (1983). See also
U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1, § 2-306 cmts. 1-3 (2013); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, supra note
_.
54 C.f. Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470,
471 (N.Y. 1923) (“agreement to agree” unenforceable).
55 In commercial requirements and outputs contracts, for example, which also lack a
specified quantity for exchange, courts require exclusive dealings to support a contract,
will impute “reasonable” maximum and minimum quantities, and impose a duty of good
faith. E.g., Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney’s, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1985);
U.C.C. § 2-306 cmts. 1-3, 5 (2013).
56 See, e.g., Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187 (N.H. 1989).
57 Christopher L. Tomlins, Law and Power in the Employment Relationship, in
LABOR LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 71–98, 74 (Christopher L.
Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992).
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subject to the scrutiny of contract law as to whether the employer’s
interpretation of the agreement comports with the parties’ intent, or
whether the employer is performing the agreement in good faith.
For instance, the court will not imply a term that would limit an
employee’s duty to obey the employer to the latter’s “reasonable”
commands. This implied right includes circumstances where the
employer seems unilaterally to change agreed-upon terms. 58 The
basic remedy is exit. The essence of the employment contract is
extra-contractual discretion. 59
C. Employment and Power
What does it mean then to say the employer has a “right” to
control the work of an employee? It means, simply, that we can
recognize something as an employment relationship when one party to a agreement for labor services has such greater bargaining
power that it can impose its will on the other: The right to control
the work means the employer will likely get its way in the course
of the parties’ negotiations. The legal definition of the employment
contract registers the inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee.
D. Interpretative Ambiguities
The tension between master-servant authority and contract
limned above creates two interpretative ambiguities in disputes
over employment status. The first, explained above, is to make
ambiguous the activities of bargaining over the work and carrying
out the work.
The second ambiguity, surfaces in attempts to interpret a written work agreement, rather than in distinguishing the activities of
58

FOX, supra note __, at 183-84; see also ATLESON, supra note _, at 13; SELZNICK,
supra note _, at 132, 136; Ayres & Gertner, supra note _. The ability to quit does not
afford both parties equal rights to interpret the contract. When an employer pays less than
agreed upon, the employee generally must look for relief to an statute requiring payment
of promised wages. Likewise, employees seeking promised bonuses, commissions, holidays, other benefits, or damages from broken promises regarding the former must generally look for a relevant state statute.
59 Christopher L. Tomlins, Law and Power in the Employment Relationship, in
LABOR LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 71–98, 74 (Christopher L.
Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992).
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bargaining and producing. The means-ends standard depicts employment as a contract, but a peculiar kind of contract. In ordinary
contracts, parties commit one another to the “ends” of the deal, but
neither has a right to dictate how the other party satisfies these
ends. The employment contract, however, gives one party an implied right to determine how the other party satisfies its contractual
duties: the employer has a right to control not only the “ends” of
the work, but also the “means” of the work. The means-ends
standard therefore depends on being able to distinguish between
contractual duties and the manner of their performance, in order to
evaluate whether one party is controlling the latter but not the former. The problem, again, is that the fusion of master-servant authority with contract makes illusory any distinction between contractual duties and how they are performed. Employer and employee exchange performance for performance and determine their contractual duties as they produce. In employment, we cannot identify
the contractual duties.
Part V illustrates how this ambiguity turns the interpretation of
a written work agreement into a puzzle in disputes over employment status. The IC decisions take the position that everything
stated in the written document the drivers signed states a contractual end, which, by definition prohibits FedEx from controlling
how drivers perform these ends. Other courts recognized that the
contract by its terms gave FedEx a right to control the contractedfor ends or collapsed the distinction altogether, revealing an employment relationship.
In sum, the attempt to fit employment in the framework of contract creates an ambiguity between the activities of bargaining and
producing, and an ambiguity between contractual duties and how
they are performed. Both make the dominant standard for distinguishing employment from independent contracting relationships—the means-end standard—irresolvable. Applying the
means-end standard requires distinguishing the activities of bargaining and producing, and, when interpreting a written agreement,
distinguishing between contractual duties and the way in which
they are performed.
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E. Employment as Institution
Marx referred to the market, “within whose boundaries the sale
and purchase of labour power goes on,” as a “very Eden of the innate rights of man,” where “alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham.” Employer and employee then “desert[]” this
“noisy sphere, where everything takes place on the surface and in
view of all men” and enter the “hidden abode of production.” 60
However, since employer and employee negotiate and produce
at the same time, since the means-ends standard cannot distinguish
between contractual duties and their performance, how do judges
distinguish the “noisy sphere” from the “hidden abode of production?” How do they distinguish where parties meet as equals—in
contract—from where they meet as superior and subordinate—in
production? The apparent coordinates of contracting and production in time and space are artifacts of practice. The intelligibility of
employment is dependent on its institutionalization.
In an industrial manufacturing firm, human resources personnel
might hire the worker and explain salary and benefits. Later, distinct personnel in a manufacturing division might supervise the
worker on the factory floor. These organizational markers of industrial employment separated the productive process from the sorting
of workers in the labor market and the contracting process. Judges
interpreting nonstandard work must find a way to makes sense of
the disorganized temporal, spatial, and bureaucratic markers of industrial employment.
NLRB v. Labor Ready 61 illustrates the task. This NLRA case
concerned a non-solicitation policy that a temporary employment
agency’s imposed in its waiting area. The legality of the policy depended on whether persons registered with the agency were employees of the agency while they were waiting for assignments.
The company argued that, although it was mandatory for registrants to be in the waiting room in order to receive job placements,
their employment relationship with the agency ended between each
assignment or after each day of work. The court rejected this argument. It argued that requiring registrants’ physical presence at
60

KARL MARX, CAPITAL, in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 452, 492 (2d ed., David McClellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (1867).
61 NLRB v. Labor Ready, Inc., 253 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2001).
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the agency to receive assignments was a form of control over their
work; the employment relationship continued between assignments.
The work arrangement in Labor Ready lacked the temporal,
spatial, and bureaucratic markers of the prototypical industrial firm
that separated the hiring process from supervisory direction. The
company interpreted registrants looking for jobs in the waiting
room as an aspect of labor market sorting, or contracting. The
court, in contrast, interpreted the waiting room requirement as an
part of the company’s process of producing its saleable service,
which was to make workers available on-demand to client firms.
The FedEx disputes, and the IC decisions in particular, suggest
that the law’s attempt to construe employment as a contract renders
even those work relations approaching the prototype of industrial
employment susceptible to redefinition.
III. FROM BARGAINING TO PRODUCING
The way that FedEx organized the drivers’ work manipulated
the ambiguities in the employment contract between bargaining
and producing. This enabled the courts to find that features of the
work that under the legal tests would be probative of an employment relationship were here consistent with, or even evidence of,
an independent contracting relationship. The IC decisions marshaled the ambiguity between producing and contracting to negate
or invert the legal meaning of nearly every factor under the legal
tests indicative of employment and to transform several features
typical of industrial work into evidence of entrepreneurial opportunity: delivery route assignments, supervision, discipline, promotions, shift replacements, training, skill, tenure, at-will authority,
scheduling, and other work rules.
A. Route Assignments, Training, and Execution of the Contract as
Institutional Marker
1. Control or Entrepreneurial Opportunity?

In what we think of as the formation of a “typical” employment
arrangement, a worker applies for a job. If accepted, the worker
meets with Human Resources personnel, perhaps signs an agree-
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ment, and then receives a desk, a phone—whatever the required
equipment for the job. And, often the worker receives training
from the company or participates in orientation.
For FedEx drivers, the sequence differs. A potential driver
completes a computerized application and undergoes a physical
examination and drug screening. 62 Next, those approved by FedEx
who do not have satisfactory commercial driving experience must
take a training course. 63 Some approved drivers also received training from FedEx and began working as FedEx drivers through a
temporary agency. 64 To become permanent, the applicant must buy
or lease a truck. Until 2008, FedEx furnished or financed trucks for
sale or lease to drivers. 65 The truck must fit FedEx’s detailed specifications (down to the brand and shade of white paint) for FedEx
trucks generally and must be approved for a particular delivery
route. 66 Only after all this would a FedEx terminal manager present the driver with a written agreement. Only in signing the
agreement does the driver officially receive the delivery route and
become a FedEx driver. 67
Ordinarily, assigning a worker to a particular service area or a
driver to a particular delivery route, 68 and training a worker, 69 are

62 FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 10-12; Fedex Home Delivery, 361
N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *4 (Sept. 30, 2014).
63 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 562-63; FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006
at 11-12;
64 FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 10; FedEx Ground Package Sys., Case 22RC-12508, slip op. at 26 (Nov. 2, 2004); Fedex Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55,
2014 WL 4926198 at *4 (Sept. 30, 2014). Drivers performed the same work whether
hired as contractors or temporary employees. FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 11;
Fedex Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *4 (Sept. 30, 2014).
65 Up until 2008, FedEx purchased custom-made trucks and sold or leased them to
potential drivers. FedEx continued to maintain relationships with outside vendors willing
to finance FedEx drivers. Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 566; Estrada, 154
Cal.App.4th at 12.
66 FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 11-12, 13, 17-18; FHD, 563 F.3d at 501;
Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 565-66, 592; Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 986, 989 (9th Cir. 2014); Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys.,
765 F.3d 1033, 3 (9th Cir. 2014).
67 FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 13-14; Fedex Home Delivery, 361
N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *4 (Sept. 30, 2014). See also Deposition of Penny Massa at 4-6, Multi-state decision, 758 F.Supp.2d 638, 2005 WL 5865334 (No. 3-05MD-527-RM).
68 See, e.g., Solis v. Velocity Exp., Inc., No. CV 09-864-MO, 2010 WL 3259917, at
*7 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2010).
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evidence of employer control over production—evidence of employment.
FedEx, however, suggested that drivers’ meetings with terminal managers were part of the bargaining process. 70 Thus, the work
relationship did not really begin until after the drivers signed the
contract. For instance, according to the former CEO of FedEx,
when a driver checked with a manager to see if a certain truck
would be permissible for the route to be assigned, it presented
FedEx with a “business plan.” 71 FedEx manipulated the ambiguity
within the employment contract by relocating the conventional
threshold between bargaining and production in industrial, or typical,” employment (Figure 1). Everything that fell on the precontract signing side of the relationship appears as part of the market sorting or bargaining process.

In reality, drivers had little leeway to make rational investment
decisions based on their “proprietary interest.” FedEx maintained
69 See, e.g., Crawford v. State, 845 P.2d 703, 706-07 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); NLRB.
v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 259 (1968).
70 Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 6-7, 52-53, FHD, 563 F.3d 492, 2008 WL
4425826 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436).
71 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 565-566.

DRAFT—DO NOT CITE

8/12/2015]

From Hierarchies to Markets

29

strict control over the volume of package deliveries in each service
area. Using advanced logistics technology and supervisory ridealongs, it structured drivers’ routes so that each driver would have
9-11 hours of deliveries per day. 72 Regardless of the desirability of
a driver’s initial route assignment, FedEx had the right to alter the
routes unilaterally and regularly did so to distribute work somewhat evenly among drivers. 73 (The document the drivers signed
expressly stated that a driver’s “proprietary” interest was limited to
their service area “as that area is configured from time to time”
unilaterally by FedEx. 74) Drivers were required to deliver every
package FedEx assigned to them each day. Further, although a
property right usually includes the right to exclude, FedEx adjusted
packages among drivers daily. Drivers were required to deliver
packages outside of delivery areas and to allow other drivers to
make deliveries in their own service areas. 75 And, if delivery volume increased on a particular route, under the driver’s compensation formula, FedEx offset the increase in piece rate earnings for
packages by decreasing the driver’s daily wage, which was inversely correlated to delivery volume and geographic density. 76
FedEx largely predetermined drivers’ pay based on hours of
work. 77 By design, bargaining over delivery areas was not a meaningful source of entrepreneurial opportunity for most drivers.
72

Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 570, 589, 590, 591. See generally Richard Mason, James L. McKenney, Walter Carlson, and Duncan Copeland, Absolutely, Positively
Operations Research: The Federal Express Story, 27 INTERFACES 17 (1997). See also
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Case 22-RC-12508, slip op. at 75 (Nov. 2, 2004) (FedEx
supervisor took into account how much break-time driver took in determining route structure).
73 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 573-574; FedEx Ground Package Sys., Case
22-RC-12508, slip op. at 54 (Nov. 2, 2004).
74 See Pick-up and Delivery Contractor Operating Agreement at ¶ 5.2, Exhibit, Defendant’s Memorandum of Law and Supplemental Statement in Opposition to Leighter
(Oregon) Motion for Class Certification, Leighter v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.,
2007 WL 6930366 (N.D.Ind. 2007) [hereinafter Operating Agreement].

75 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 561, 569-70; Brief of Petitioner/CrossRespondent at 6-7, FHD, 563 F.3d 492, 2008 WL 4425826 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436);
Operating Agreement at ¶ 5.1.
76 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 567, 589; Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 2014).
77 See, e.g., Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 567 (daily wage rate calculated based
on hours of assigned work); Deposition of Michael Callahan, Kansas decision, 734

(continued next page)
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However, the courts finding the drivers to be independent contractors largely followed FedEx’s cues with respect to the company’s manipulation of the institutional markers of industrial employment. They did not find the route assignments to be evidence
of FedEx’s right to control the means of the work. 78 The D.C. Circuit suggested that route assignments were evidence of entrepreneurial opportunity, because a driver might acquire a delivery route
with expanding package volume. 79 Judge Miller suggested they
went to FedEx’s control only over “results” of the work; he characterized them not as an assignment of work by FedEx, but as a driver’s contractual agreement to service a particular area. 80 Both
courts emphasized drivers’ contracted-for “proprietary” rights as
key to their finding that drivers were independent contractors, on
the basis that it revealed their entrepreneurial opportunity. 81 The IC
decisions thus reinterpreted delivery area assignments as evidence
of independence in bargaining rather than dependence in producing.
The courts also reinterpreted or lessened the import of the drivers’ training and FedEx’s control over the delivery vehicles. Judge
Miller asserted that the training drivers underwent before signing
the contract “isn’t training, but a precondition, to becoming a contractor.” 82 The D.C. Circuit suggested that the training requirement
was insubstantial evidence of employment status in the FedEx situation, merely reflecting the results the drivers contracted to provide, or the “type of service the contractors are providing rather

F.Supp.2d 557, 2005 WL 5865335 (No. 3:05-MD-527-RM); FedEx Ground Package
Sys., Case 22-RC-12508, slip op. at 44-45 (Nov. 2, 2004).
78 FHD, 563 F.3d 492; Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557.
79 FHD, 563 F.3d at 500 (arguing “routes are geographically defined, and they likely
have value dependent on those geographic specifics which some contractors can better
exploit than others. For example, as people move into an area, the ability to profit from
that migration varies”).
80 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 589 (“Various provisions of the Operating
Agreement authorize FedEx to control the days of service, the contractor's daily workload, and certain time windows when pick-ups and deliveries must be made. These requirements weigh in favor of employee status, but are more suggestive of a resultsoriented approach to management when viewed with the totality of circumstances.”)
81 FHD, 563 F.3d at 502, 503; Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 596-97, 601.
82 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 563. Based in part on the additional training
FedEx provided after drivers signed the agreement, Judge Miller found that the training
factor weighed somewhat in favor of employee status. Id. at 595.
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than differences in the employment relationship.” 83 Agreeing with
FedEx, 84 the D.C. Circuit suggested that drivers “invested” in an
independent business by purchasing or leasing FedEx trucks. 85
FedEx’s manipulation of the bargaining/producing ambiguity
formed a basis for disagreement among the courts. Several other
courts found the route assignments to be evidence that the drivers
were employees. 86 For example, in two decisions, the 9th Circuit
argued that the route assignments were evidence of FedEx’s control over the means of the work, not merely the results. 87 The Kansas Supreme Court remarked, “the procedure by which a driver
becomes qualified to deliver packages for FedEx more closely resembles the process by which employees are hired than the process
by which independent contractor agreements are negotiated. 88
The extent that drivers “invested” in their own businesses was
also a point of disagreement. The NLRB and a federal district court
suggested the FedEx-specific nature of the vehicles and their use of
the trucks for a regular and integral service of the alleged employer’s business augured an employment relationship. 89 The Kansas
Supreme Court argued that requiring drivers to purchase some of
the tools of work did not so much show that drivers invested in

83

FHD, 563 F.3d at 501.
Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 24, FHD, 563 F.3d 492, 2008 WL
4425828 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436).
85 The D.C. Circuit characterized the requirement that drivers purchase or lease
FedEx trucks as drivers “suppl[ying] their own equipment” and argued that this indicated
entrepreneurial opportunity. FHD, 563 F.3d at 498, 503. The 9th Circuit, though it ultimately found the drivers to be employees as a matter of law, also found the tools factor,
when considered alone, to weigh slightly in favor of independent contractor status. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014); Slayman v. FedEx
Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033, 10 (9th Cir. 2014).
86 Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, 82-83 (Kan. 2014); Wells
v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006, 1019 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (noting that
service areas were “assigned” by FedEx and suggesting that true independent contractors
found their own work).
87 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2014);
Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033, 1044 (9th Cir. 2014).
88 Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, at *807 (Kan. 2014).
89 Fedex Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *19 (Sept. 30,
2014) (noting that investment in FedEx trucks and equipment suggests long-term relationship). Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006, at *6, 13 (E.D. Mo.
2013).
84
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their own businesses, but rather that they invested in their FedEx
jobs. 90
2. Contract Execution as Temporal, Institutional Marker

Since the legal standard cannot distinguish where employer and
employee meet as equals—in contract—from where they meet as
superior and subordinate—we create institutional markers to do so.
Like a Human Resources department or other bureaucratic marker,
the written contract appears as an institutional index tab: It purports to divide the work relationship into distinct and legally cognizable segments—the ends of the work and the means of the
work, or contractual negotiation and performance.
FedEx and the IC decisions construct the contract signing as an
institutional marker of non-employment: everything that happens
before the contract signing is bargaining over the work; only what
happens afterwards is production. A driver’s execution of a written
agreement signals the relationship is one of independent contracting by marking a clear break between the negotiation process and
the endowment of enforceable rights. 91
3. A Critique

Despite the inherent ambiguity within the employment contract
between bargaining and producing, the construction of the execution of the written agreement as an institutional marker of nonemployment is problematic for both doctrinal and policy reasons.
The written document the drivers sign is not performing the work
of a contract: it is not separating the market sorting and bargaining
process from the carrying out of an enforceable contract.
90 Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, at *822-23 (Kan. 2014).
Given that in several cases drivers suing under statutes that prohibited employers from
charging employees for business expenses, it seems rather circular to argue that requiring
drivers to buy or lease their work trucks was evidence of the law’s inapplicability, rather
than evidence of FedEx’s violation of the law (in spirit).
91 For another example, see Solis v. Velocity Express, No. CV 09-864-MO, 2010
WL 3259917 at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2010), an overtime case involving a shipping company that converted its delivery drivers from employees to independent contractors. The
court queried whether the company’s route assignments were evidence of the company’s
“control over its workers or simply an unprofitable contractual bargain.” It found that the
“critical evidence” was that drivers “received their route assignments after they contracted with Velocity Express.” Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
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As a doctrinal matter, drivers begin submitting to FedEx’s authority as employees before they sign the agreement. They receive
training and begin following FedEx’s directions in acquiring and
outfitting a truck for an assigned route. The relationship is closer to
that of a master-servant relationship than a contract. Secondly, as
noted above, post-signing the agreement did not provide the drivers with meaningful business property in their routes that they
could exploit as entrepreneurs.
As a policy matter, recall that the drivers in the IC decisions
were trying to unionize and exercise rights to statutory wages. At a
minimum, these laws are intended to protect vulnerable workers.
FedEx and the IC decisions’ resolution of the ambiguity between
bargaining and producing disrupts these policy objectives. FedEx
hired drivers without any requirements as to skill, experience, or
capital. 92 The unskilled nature of the work was evidence that the
drivers should be classified as employees under the legal tests.93
FedEx also dictated all of the instrumentalities of work and restricted drivers’ property rights in the vehicles. 94 These characteristics of the relationship also suggested it fit well within the policy
scope of collective bargaining and minimum wage and hour law.
Shifting the temporal site of contract signing does not correspond
to a transmutation of bargaining power.
By manipulating the sequencing of the contract signing, however, rather than bargaining with an unskilled and property-less
92 See, e.g., Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 562, 599 (describing “minimal eligibility requirements” to become a FedEx driver and ability to learn the required skills
through FedEx’s training or supervision on the job); FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006
at 10-11 (describing process of becoming a FedEx driver).
93 See, e.g., Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 599; FHD, 563 F.3d at 507 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
94 See, e.g., Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, at *808 (Kan.
2014); Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 597; FHD, 563 F.3d at 514 (dissent); Wells v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006, at *13 (E.D. Mo. 2013). Drivers’ most
valuable property rights in their vehicle ownership or leases appeared to be the ability to
sell them, particularly to other FedEx drivers. Rather than give drivers’ autonomy over
their market destinies, requiring drivers to purchase the vehicles tended to limit their
ability to quit. It saddled drivers with debt payments for a truck that had little commercial
use apart from servicing FedEx. See GREENHOUSE, supra note _; Deposition of Michael
Callahan, Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557, 2005 WL 5865335 (No. 3:05-MD-527RM). Furthermore, FedEx limited drivers’ use of their vehicles for non-FedEx purposes.
Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557. FedEx could also suspend a driver without notice,
lock the driver’s truck in the terminal, and prevent the driver from accessing it. (N.D.
Ind.)
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worker, it appears that the company is bargaining with an independent business—one that happens to possess the requisite
equipment, skill, and knowledge. The D.C. Circuit, for example,
did not address the skill factor at all, and it commented, “Servicing
a route is not cheap; one needs a truck (which the contractor pays
for) and a driver (which the contractor also pays for, either directly
or in kind).” 95 Rather than meeting as subordinate and superior on
the factory floor, drivers seem to meet FedEx as equals at the bargaining table. 96
B. Negotiation or Unilateral Changes to Work Duties?
The IC decisions also reinterpreted FedEx’s right to alter
routes unilaterally as evidence consistent with independent entrepreneurialism. FedEx regularly monitored delivery volumes on
each route and reconfigured routes to even out workloads among
drivers as deliveries expanded or contracted. This reflects the continuing and simultaneous bargaining and directing of the work that
characterizes an employment relationship, where FedEx, as the
stronger party, always prevails. The IC decisions exploited the ambiguity between contracting and producing to interpret FedEx’s
adjustments to drivers’ delivery routes as frequent re-openings of
the negotiation process.
The D.C. Circuit, for example, accepted FedEx’s characterization of the company’s right to unilaterally alter routes (in return for
some compensation) as a “Mutual Intention to Reduce the Geographic Size of Primary Service Area.” 97 To keep its route in the
case of expanding business, FedEx might require a driver to acquire additional trucks and supervise other FedEx drivers. If a
driver found this infeasible or undesirable, FedEx could change the
driver’s route. FedEx characterized a driver’s submission to a
mandatory route change as a driver “decid[ing] to forgo the busi95

FHD, 563 F.3d at 500.
The courts’ emphasis on entrepreneurial opportunity also tended to suppress the
legal weight of the unskilled nature of the work. FedEx and Judge Miller suggested that
entrepreneurialism was a skill. Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557 (suggesting that the
agreement required drivers to have business management skills).
97 FHD, 563 F.3d 492; Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 20, 22, FHD,
563 F.3d 492, 2008 WL 4425828 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436). 20, 22 (quoting Operating
Agreement drivers signed).
96
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ness growth opportunity” 98 Note the language of equality in bargaining rather than subordination in production. While it might appear that FedEx was controlling the work in determining delivery
areas, the parties were really just reopening negotiations. If FedEx
always managed to prevail, it was by driving a hard bargain, not
being an employer.
Once a court concludes that most features of the relationship
that might suggest subordination or inequality were incidents of
bargaining rather than production, they became irrelevant to the
court’s decision, and even taboo, as an issue of bargaining power.
The D.C. Circuit thus remarked, “we will ‘draw no inference of
employment status from merely the economic controls which many
corporations are able to exercise over independent contractors with
whom they contract.” 99
A California Appellate Court rejected FedEx’s characterization
of route assignments as evidence of independence in bargaining,
noting that the terminal managers who assigned routes were “drivers’ immediate supervisors and can unilaterally reconfigure the
drivers’ routes without regard to the drivers’ resulting loss of income.” 100
C. Termination or Aborted Negotiation?
The authority to terminate a worker at-will is generally evidence of employment rather than independent contracting under
the legal standards for employment status. 101 By default, employment in the U.S. is an at-will relationship, meaning either party
may terminate it at any time for a good reason, a bad reason, or no
98 Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 22, FHD, 563 F.3d 492, 2008 WL
4425828 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436).
99 FHD, 563 F.3d at 502, n. 8 (citing NAVL, 869 F.2d at 599). See also, Fedex
Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *26 (Sept. 30, 2014) (Johnson dissenting) (characterizing FedEx’s control over routes and its right to disapprove of
an assignee to a driver’s job as a use of “contractual power” and arguing that contractual
power is a prohibited consideration under the governing test for employment status).
100 Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 336 (Ct. App.
2007). At some point, FedEx modified the document signed by the Estrada drivers. The
new document reserved FedEx’s right to unilaterally change the routes but provided a
formula to compensate drivers who lost pay due to a reconfiguration. Kansas decision,
734 F.Supp.2d at 574; FHD, 563 F.3d at 501.
101 See e.g., Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 598; Borello, 769 P.2d at 404.
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reason at all. 102 Performing continuous services for a long, indefinite period of time is also evidence of employment. 103 Usually, independent contractors are hired to “achieve a specific result that is
attainable within a finite period of time.” 104
The FedEx drivers signed an initial contract of one, two, or
three years that renewed automatically. FedEx had a right to cancel
the renewal without cause. 105 The company claimed that its fixedterm contracts drivers were evidence that the drivers were independent contractors. 106 In practice, FedEx hired drivers for long
periods of time 107 and their work—delivering packages to FedEx
customers—continued indefinitely. FedEx also awarded vacation
time based on driver seniority. 108
Recall that, in contractual terms, the employer and employee
bargain over their relationship and perform it at the same time. To
the extent employment is a contract, it is continuously renewed at
each moment the relationship endures. 109 To say that employment
is “at-will” simply means that at some moment the employer
and/or employee decide not to renew the contract. Maybe the employee decides not to accept the employer’s terms and conditions
conveyed through the employer’s direction of the work. Or, perhaps the employer feels the employee has not agreed to its terms
by performing deficient work. Regardless of the reason, the parties
stop bargaining.
The ambiguity between the activities of contracting and producing enabled the courts ruling for FedEx to interpret FedEx’s
partial at-will authority as evidence of independent contracting.
Judge Miller suggested that, rather than evincing a right to terminate a driver, this simply showed that FedEx had a right not to en102

See, e.g., Lake Land Emp. Grp. of Akron, LLC v. Columber, 2004-Ohio-786, ¶
17, 101 Ohio St. 3d 242, 247, 804 N.E.2d 27, 32.
103 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (citing
Community for Creative Non–Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989).
104 Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 887, 900 (2008).
105 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 574, 596; FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision
2006 at 16.
106 Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, *817 (Kan. 2014); FedEx Summary Judgment Brief at 15, Craig, 335 P.3d 66.
107 In a California case, the average driver worked for FedEx for 8 years. Estrada v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 337 (Ct. App. 2007).
108 FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 25-26.
109 See supra Part II.
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gage in “repeat business.” 110 He argued that the right to cancel a
driver’s contract renewal without cause “isn’t atypical of an independent contractor relationship where a hiring party can simply
decide not to re-hire a worker.” 111 The court exploited the ambiguity between bargaining over the work and carrying it out to interpret FedEx’s partial at-will authority as evidence of the drivers’
contractual independence rather than subordination in production. 112
This construction of FedEx’s authority to cancel a drivers’ contract renewal also dimmed the importance of the duration of the
relationship and the continuous nature of the service provided.
Judge characterized this practice as one bearing on contracting rather than production, noting a company “might wish to deal with
reliable suppliers, middlemen, or subcontractors.” 113 Noting the
drivers’ agreement was for a definite term, he found that the length
of the relationship did not weigh in favor of either party. 114
The ambiguity between bargaining and producing in employment was behind some of the disagreement among courts trying to
interpret the three factors discussed above with respect to FedEx
drivers—whether the relationship was at-will, the length of the
work relationship, and whether the services were discrete or continuous. 115 One court argued, “Plaintiffs could effectively be ter110

Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 595 (quoting Home Design, Inc. v. Kansas
Dep’t of Human Res., 27 Kan.App.2d 242, 247(2000). See also State Comp. Ins. Fund v.
Brown, 32 Cal. App. 4th 188, 203, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 105 (1995), as modified (Feb. 8,
1995) (right to terminate contract with 14 days of notice was “consistent either with an
employment-at-will relationship or parties in a continuing contractual relationship.”) C.f.
Taylor v. Shippers Transp. Express, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-02092 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014)
(arguing that drayage company’s right to terminate port drivers’ 90-day, automatically
renewable contracts on 30 days notice for any reason was equivalent to at-will authority).
111 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 595.
112 The D.C. Circuit cited the length of service as a relevant legal factor but ignored
it entirely in its analysis of the drivers’ status. FHD, 563 F.3d at 496. In practice, FedEx
had at-will authority over the drivers. See infra Part V.
113 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 596. (emphasis added).
114 Id.
115 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (arguing that length of time for performance of the drivers’ work was evidence of employment); Fedex Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *19 (Sept. 30,
2014) (arguing that length of relationship favored employment status, despite short-term
nature of contracts); Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, *818 (Kan.
2014) (disagreeing with FedEx that fixed term contracts were evidence that the drivers
were independent contractors and arguing that the length of the relationship favored employment status); Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006, *1-12
(continued next page)
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minated at will given that the [agreement] provides for nonrenewal
without cause.” 116 Another court also argued that FedEx could
terminate drivers by retaining the right not to renew a driver’s contract without any cause and doing so in practice. 117
D. Performance Evaluation or Bargaining?
Interpreting FedEx’s right to cancel a driver’s contract renewal
as a cessation of negotiations rather than as quasi-at-will authority
enabled to reinterpret other factors usually indicative of employment 118 as consistent with independent contracting: the right to supervise and discipline the worker.
FedEx supervised drivers and evaluated every detail of their
work. Managers inspected drivers’ vehicles and their personal
grooming each morning and could prevent them from working or
suspend them without notice if they did not pass inspection. The
company monitored drivers during the day through scanning devices that recorded the location and time of each package delivery.
Drivers were also subject to occasional management ride-alongs,
in which a manager would sit with a drivers for the day and take
detailed notes on the work, including, for example, whether a driver conveyed a “’sense of urgency,’ and ‘[p]laces [his or her] keys
on [the] pinky finger of [his or her] non-writing hand’ after locking
the delivery vehicle.” 119
(E.D. Mo. 2013) (duration of drivers’ relationship was evidence of employee status);
Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, *10, 11 (Ct. App.
2007). 10, 11 (citing length of relationship as evidence of employment and noting drivers
had long-term relationship with FedEx). See also Estrada v. FedEx Ground, No. BC
210310, 2004 WL 5631425, at *16 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 26, 2004) (drivers have longterm relationship with FedEx).
116 Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006, *16 (E.D. Mo. 2013).
117 Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, *1, 10, 11 (Ct.
App. 2007). Some courts found that FedEx did not have a complete right to terminate
drivers without cause due to an arbitration provision in the agreement. FHD NLRB Reg.
Dir. decision 2006 at 60; Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 1033,
1046 (9th Cir. 2014). At least two courts have struck down the provision.
118 See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 994 (9th Cir.
2014) 994; FHD, 563 F.3d at 498.
119 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir.
2014). FedEx instructed managers to gather detailed information, including “the time the
driver arrives and departs from each stop, the number of minutes at each stop, the number
of minutes between stops, the last three digits of the driver’s odometer reading at each
stop, and the approximate distance the driver must walk to pick up or deliver a package.”
(continued next page)
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Drivers were subject to regular performance evaluations, and
these formed the basis for FedEx’s decisions regarding bonuses,
suspensions, promotions, repeated training, termination, and contract renewal. FedEx referred to the meetings as “Business Discussions,” part of the contracting process, not production. FedEx also
referred to the division that reviewed drivers’ and made recommendations on contract termination and nonrenewal as a “Contractor Relations” division. 120
The IC decisions accepted FedEx’s characterization of what
look to be employee performance evaluations with human resource
personnel as a “Business Discussion” between an independent contractor and “Contractor Liaison.” The decisions depict the performance evaluations as forward-looking bargaining between independent businesses, not control over production. For example,
Judge Miller acknowledged that FedEx closely supervised the
driver’s work and that drivers were subject to corrective measures.
However, since he decided that FedEx did not have at-will authority over the drivers, rather than control the means of the work, he
argued that FedEx merely gave drivers “suggestions of best practices” for drivers to follow in producing the contracted-for-service,
or “ends” of their work. 121
Another court rejected FedEx’s attempt to refashion some of
the institutional markers of traditional employment as markers of
independent contracting. It also refused to interpret FedEx’s disciplinary authority as incidents of contracting:
According to [FedEx personnel], Contractor Relations is a
liaison between [FedEx] and [drivers] in order to guarantee
the independent contractor model. The purpose of Contractor Relations is to review recommendations for contract
termination or non-renewal and to make certain that terminal managers do not overstep their bounds…However, a
closer look shows that Contractor Relations is nothing more
Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 572 (N.D. Ind. 2010). FedEx also used customer audits to review driver performance. FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 12, 21.
120 FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 12, 21; Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d
at 594. A business discussion might involve a customer complaint, for which a manager
required the driver to undergo a training course and threatened a pay penalty. In re FedEx
Ground Package Sys., Inc., 273 F.R.D. 499 (N.D. Ind. 2010).
121 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 594-595.
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than a mere branch of management…Contractor Relations
must be seen in a role akin to Human Relations over employees, wherein the highest levels of management have the
final say. 122
This court viewed the role of Contractor Relations as consistent
with an employer’s open-ended authority over production, not with
the discrete obligations undertaken by parties to a contract. 123
E. Promotion or Business Expansion?
The interpretation of what very much resemble the internal
promotion of a driver to a supervisory position offer another example of how the courts ruling in FedEx’s favor drew on the tension between master-servant authority and contract to reinterpret a
feature of typical employment.
A driver could ask FedEx to oversee multiple routes. FedEx
had unilateral discretion over whether to grant such requests,
which it exercised in part based on existing route coverage and
business volume. If FedEx granted permission, the driver became
responsible for “hiring” and supervising other FedEx drivers, and
acquiring additional FedEx vehicles. 124 FedEx limited the number
of routes one driver could manage, and it retained unilateral authority to re-configure the routes and adjust packages among
routes, as it did with the single route drivers. 125 Any driver who
worked under the supervision of a multiple route operator had to
first be become a FedEx driver. They had to agree to abide by all
of the rules in written agreement with FedEx. They also had to undergo the training and orientation and submit to drug testing and
122 Estrada v. FedEx Ground, No. BC 210310, 2004 WL 5631425, at *6 (Cal. Super.
Ct. July 26, 2004) (emphasis added).
123 The FHD dissent also suggested that “Business Discussions” resembled employee performance evaluations, noting they could lead to discipline. FHD, 563 F.3d at 513
(dissenting). While agreeing that FedEx did not have a “traditional” system of “reprimand” or “discipline,” the NLRB Regional Director in FHD likewise suggested that
FedEx had disciplinary authority consistent with employer status. FHD NLRB Reg. Dir.
decision 2006 at 15, n.23.
124 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 596; FHD, 563 F.3d at 499; Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033, *10 (9th Cir. 2014); Fedex Home Delivery, 361
N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, *10 (Sept. 30, 2014).
125 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 573-74, 596; FHD, 563 F.3d at 501.
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background checks. FedEx could disapprove of anyone a multiple
route operator sought to hire. 126 In essence, drivers could only
“hire” their coworkers, with FedEx’s permission.
The FHD majority and Judge Miller contended that driver requests to serve multiple routes was evidence of the entrepreneurial
potential for business expansion—activity in the moment of contracting rather than evidence of internal job ladders in production. 127
What looks like an internal promotion of a driver the IC decisions
transformed into a driver successfully bargaining with FedEx to
expand its own business. A feature of the work that ordinarily suggested employer control over productive activities—organizing a
supervisory hierarchy—became an incident of bargaining over the
work. 128
Another court disagreed. It interpreted the company’s discretionary grants of multiple routes to drivers as an activity of production—akin to an internal promotion—rather than an activity of
contractual negotiation by which driver-entrepreneurs expanded
their businesses:
[N]o [single-route driver] can become a[][multipleroute driver] without the consent of [FedEx] (unless
without the knowledge of [FedEx], a person purchases
126

Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 994 (9th Cir. 2014);
Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033, at *10 (9th Cir. 2014); FHD
NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006, at 40; Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 64 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 327, at *12 (Ct. App. 2007). See also Fedex Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No.
55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *10 (Sept. 30, 2014).
127 FHD, 563 F.3d at 499; Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 596.
128 FHD, 563 F.3d at 499; Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 596. Similarly, FedEx
might allow—or require—a driver to obtain an additional truck and driver. Reply Brief of
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 21, FHD, 563 F.3d 492, 2008 WL 4425828 (Nos. 071391, 07-1436); Deposition of Michael Callahan at 6-7, Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d
557, 2005 WL 5865335 (No. 3:05-MD-527-RM). Again, all extra drivers had to first
form a work relationship with FedEx and be pre-approved by FedEx. See, e.g., Kansas
decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 562-63, 589. FedEx referred to a driver’s acquisition of additional vehicles and its agreement to oversee other FedEx drivers as a “business growth
opportunity.” Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 21, FHD, 563 F.3d 492,
2008 WL 4425828 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436). The IC decisions agreed with FedEx that
allowing or forcing a driver to hire another FedEx driver was not evidence the FedEx
controlled the means of the work, but only evidence that FedEx contracted for certain
“results,” and even evidence of drivers’ entrepreneurial opportunity. Kansas decision,
734 F.Supp.2d at 588, 589; FHD, 563 F.3d at 504.
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another [single-route driver’s] corporation that has additional routes). A new route cannot be created without
the approval of [FedEx]. The chance of a [single route
driver] to become a [multiple route driver] is similar to
that of an associate of a law firm, who has the opportunity some day to become a partner. The mere potential of that associate to become a partner does not
transform his or her employee status to that of an independent contractor. 129
The courts exploit the ambiguities resulting from the awkward
fit of master-servant authority and contract to negate or even invert
the legal meaning of many features of the work. Many of these features indicate that the delivery drivers’ relationship wit FedEx is
not passable as a contractual relationship and are relevant to the
policy concerns of the law.
IV. FROM HIERARCHY TO MARKET
A. Markets and Hierarchies
Theories of the firm have attempted to explain why firms exist
as an alternative to markets for organizing production, and to account for their bordering. The question is often termed, what determines whether a firm will “make” an input to production or instead “buy” an input to production? Two classic firm theorists,
Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, defined the market in contradistinction to the firm: in markets, production was organized
through decentralized, voluntary exchanges, mediated through the
price mechanism. In firms, production was organized through the
command relation, a “hierarchy.” 130
Firms existed because market transactions were not costless.
Participants to a market transaction might avoid certain costs, like
129 Estrada v. FedEx Ground, No. BC 210310, 2004 WL 5631425, at *15 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 26, 2004). See also FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 3 (multiple route
drivers are FedEx supervisors and their “employees” are FedEx employees).
130 Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Oliver Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61
AMER. ECON. REV. 112, 114 (1971). See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES (1975).
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that of monitoring their transacting partners. However, they often
incurred other costs. It might take time and resources to locate
suitable partners, determine prices, and negotiate an agreement. 131
One might be at risk to opportunistic behavior by a partner and
face difficulty predicting and adapting to relevant contingencies. 132
Firms would exist when the costs of organizing production through
the market exceeded the costs of organizing production through
fiat. 133
Williamson argued that contracting costs corresponded to dimensions of the “transaction,” a step in the production process. 134
These dimensions were recurrence, market uncertainty, and asset
specificity. Regarding recurrence, a firm might find it cheaper to
make an input to production rather than repeatedly go to the market to buy it. Uncertainty about the costs of input might also motivate firm production. Asset specificity referred to the extent the
parties were interdependent on one another because they incurred
durable, transaction-specific investments. 135
B. The Firm as Employment Relationship
Firm theories tend to associate firms and markets with different
legal relations: market transactions were done through contract,
while the legal authority for fiat within the firm cam from property
rights and the employment relationship. 136 Sometimes major theo131

Coase, supra note _, at 386.
Williamson, Governance, supra note _, at 246; Williamson, Economics, supra
note _, at 553; WILLIAMSON, supra note _.
133 See Williamson, Economics, supra note _, at 552-553. See generally Coase, supra note _; WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975).
134 Williamson defined the “transaction” as the “transfer of a good or service over a
technologically separable interface.” Economics, supra note _, at 552.
135 Williamson, Governance, supra note _.
136 See, e.g., Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989): 1757–74; OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES 30, 78 (1975); Williamson, Governance, supra note _, at 241-42 (suggesting
that unenforceability of contract clause prohibiting opportunistic behavior could make the
firm a more efficient governance structure for long-term commercial relationships); Williamson, Economics, supra note _, at 559; Benjamin, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L AND ECON. 297, 302-03 (1978). Scholars often use the term “contractual” to
refer to any kind of (usually presupposed) exchange/market relationship. See Gordon
Smith, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, n.63 (2009) (noting that when
scholars refer to “relational contracts,” they are often referring to non-legal dimensions of
132

(continued next page)
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rists of the firm spoke of firms and markets almost interchangeably
with employment and contracting. 137 Coase suggested, for example, that when an entrepreneur wanted a long-term but flexible
agreement, and did not want to work out important details ahead of
time, the legal template of contract—which requires that parties
specify their rights and obligations with some certainty upfront—
was unsuitable. In this case, the entrepreneur must use the employment relationship, or firm, which afforded the entrepreneur
more open-ended authority. 138 Coase’s account thus restates the
very reason judges and treatise writers in the 19th century incorporated master-servant relations into contracts for labor services—to
grant more discretionary control to the employer than that afforded
by contract. 139
Also evocative of the intimate relationship between conceptions of the firm and employment, firm theorists have conceptualized the firm as a superior governance structure for coordinating a
complex division of labor, or multilateral relations in production.
Alchian and Demsetz, for example, suggest that firm production
might be desired when production involved a complex division of
labor, making it difficult to coordinate through a contract, which
contemplated a bilateral relationship. Make or buy decisions would
exchange relations). C.f. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Ian MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of
Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract
Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978). Many theorists of the institutional structures for
coordinating resources in production have complicated the binary firm-market taxonomy,
proposing new governance forms, like “network,” focusing more on informal dimensions
of commercial relationships, and/or defining organizational forms in terms other than the
legal relations that structure them. See, e.g., Gordon Smith, supra; OLIVER WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 16-18 (1985); Reinier Kraakman, The Durability of the Corporate Form, in THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 147 (Paul DiMaggio ed.
2001) (empahsizing the centrality of the corporate form even in networks).
137 See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market
Failure Considerations, 61 AMER. ECON. REV. 112, 113-14 (1971). In discussing the
putative trade-off between flexibility and calculability associated with firms and markets,
respectively, Williamson argues that the firm offered the advantage of control (and thus
greater calculability) through the employment relationship. See also OLIVER
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 78 (1975); Alchian and Demsetz, supra note _,
at 783 (equating the capitalist “firm” with the “employer.”) See generally Bodie, supra
note _.
138 Coase, supra note _, at 391-392.
139 CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 230–31, 283–84 (1993).
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depend on how best to realize the advantages of cooperative production—production based on the joint use of inputs. 140 They reject Coase’s notion that the command relation defines the firm;
however, their analysis of how to reduce shirking and meter individual productivity suggests that the firm is more efficient when
most input owners contribute primarily the ability to work and not
other assets. 141
Robert Gibbons has focused on property ownership to illustrate
the firm-employment connection: “making” an input to production
entails purchasing labor effort and the other supplies needed to
make the input from separate suppliers—the supplier of labor effort (the employee) does not possess the other supplies. A “buy”
decision means purchasing labor effort and complementary supplies from a supplier who possesses both, and who has already
combined them into a completed input for sale. 142 In major economic theories of the firm, employment largely distinguishes the
firm from the market. 143
C. The Firm and the Legal Tests
The industrial firm was the empirical model for Coase’s theory
of the firm and the legal tests for employment status. As both bear
its imprint, it should be unsurprising that the firm-employment
connection is immanent in the legal tests for employment status.
For example, under the legal tests, unskilled workers are more likely to be employees than independent contractors. Hiring unskilled
workers, particularly in an economy where labor supply exceeds
demand, also suggests the entrepreneur is “making” a production
input. The entrepreneur expends few resources to search the market for no-frill labor effort. Unskilled work and the entrepreneur’s
ownership of the tools of production also suggest a “make” deci140 Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); see also Bodie, supra note _, at
39.
141 Alchian and Demsetz, supra note _.
142 Robert Gibbons, Firms (and Other Relationships), in THE TWENTY-FIRSTCENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE,
186, 188-89 (Paul DiMaggio ed. 2001).
143 See Matthew Bodie’s Participating as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 661 (2014).
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sion under Gibbon’s theory: the “upstream party”—the employee—contributes effort, not effort plus assets. 144 Under a transaction
cost theory of the firm, supplying the tools of production and requiring workers to undergo in-house training augur firm production as well. These elements suggest asset specificity and high uncertainty regarding whether the entrepreneur will find labor possessing the desired knowledge on the market. Whether the supplier
sells its services to others, or “whether or not the one employed is
engaged in a distinct occupation or business,” 145 also measure asset
specificity and uncertainty. Similarly, under Gibbons’ theory, an
upstream party in a market with one buyer is an employee. Likewise, under Coase and Williamson’s theory, firms would be expected to incur costs in ex post monitoring and sanctions in organizing production, but expect the entrepreneur who is contracting
with independent suppliers to incur more of its costs in ex ante negotiations. Consistent with this expectation, supervision of the
work and a right to discipline the worker are evidence of employment under the legal tests. The extent to which the work is part of
the alleged employer’s “regular business” more explicitly asks
whether the worker is part of a firm, and therefore more likely an
employee. 146
D. Destabilizing the Firm: The FedEx Enterprise as “Market”
Due to the close relationship between socio-legal conceptions
of the firm and employment, the tension between master-servant
authority and contract within employment tends to destabilize the
conventional boundary between firms and markets. As conceived
by major theories of the firm, contractual relations in the market
tend to be direct, bilateral, discrete, and putatively equal. Likewise,
relations of production within a firm tend to be hierarchical, multilateral, and indefinite. The tension between bargaining and producing in employment reappears as a tension within the firm: employment as a contract is direct and bilateral, but employment is

144

Gibbons, supra note _.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
146 Id.
145
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also the legal rationale for the firm’s centralized control over indirect and multilateral relations in production. 147
1. Transforming FedEx into a Market
Within the terms of major firm theories, like those of Coase,
Williamson, Gibbons, and Alchian and Demsetz, FedEx is clearly
making delivery services, not going to the market to buy them.
FedEx does not incur costs in searching the market for contractors with certain skills, experience, and equipment. 148 It hires unskilled workers, who furnish no specialized assets, through a
standardized application. 149 Likewise, FedEx does not incur costs
in negotiating or drafting a contract, given drivers sign a standardized, non-negotiable agreement. The required training and FedEx’s
provision of the tools of work also reflect asset specificity. By hiring unskilled workers and training them, FedEx minimized the risk
that the experience and skill required for the job might be unavailable on the market, particularly given that FedEx was the only
buyer. Instead, FedEx incurred costs in training, monitoring, and
disciplining workers.
FedEx’s control over delivery routes and daily workloads—its
control over the initial route assignment, its monitoring of business
volume, its frequent adjustment of route and package assignments—reveals a firm directing resources through fiat as it determines an efficient division of labor. 150 The price mechanism is not
determining the drivers’ business volume. The route assignment
also suggests firm production due to its high asset specificity from
the driver’s perspective. To receive a route, the driver must first
make costly, “durable, transaction-specific investments,” 151 or in-

147

See Alchian and Demsetz, supra note _, at 794 (firm production involves “central
common party to a set of bilateral contracts,” which “facilitates efficient organization of
the joint inputs”).
148 See Coase, supra note _.
149 Under Gibbons’ theory, FedEx is purchasing labor alone from the drivers, not labor plus assets. FedEx is the only buyer on the market for these services, and the drivers
sell only to FedEx. They do not own and control assets useful in the production of other
goods or services. Gibbons, supra note _,
150 See Coase, supra note _; Alchian and Demsetz, supra note _.
151 See Williamson, Economics, supra note _.
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vest in resources, like a FedEx vehicle and training, that are difficult to redeploy to other uses. 152
Nor did FedEx expose itself to uncertainty as to the price it
supposedly pays for its delivery services: FedEx pre-determined its
labor costs. Similarly, the company absorbed most of the risk of
cost increases in non-labor inputs to production. While it externalized some production costs onto drivers, like fuel and vehicle
maintenance, FedEx also assisted drivers with these costs. Further,
FedEx realized economies of scale, for instance, in purchasing insurance for drivers. In sum, FedEx did not go to the market, repeatedly, to acquire the same service—a service for which it is the
only buyer—from thousands of different independent suppliers.
Regarding the proposed trade-off the firm offered between flexibility and calculability, FedEx left nothing to chance.
However, the contradiction between master-servant authority
and contract enabled FedEx and the courts to transform a firm, as
conceived by major economic theories of the firm, into a market.
The IC decisions masked “make” decisions—FedEx’s purchase of
labor effort—as “buy” decisions—FedEx’s purchase of labor, labor effort absorbed and transmuted into a completed service. Thus,
the IC decisions reinterpret performance evaluations and disciplinary action against the drivers as contractual negotiations between
the drivers and FedEx. Supervision and ex post correction, characteristic of a firm transaction, become the activities of ex ante information gathering and negotiation, indicative of a market transaction. 153 Judge Miller, following FedEx’s cues, suggested training
drivers was a cost to FedEx of transacting on the market—a “buy”
decision. It was a “precondition” to contracting, an asset drivers
brought with them to the bargaining table. In interpreting FedEx’s
cancellation of a driver’s otherwise automatic contract renewal as
an aborted negotiation rather than an employee termination, the IC
decisions also depicted what resembled a firm under economic
152

Drivers were not allowed to use their trucks for other commercial purposes during the 45-55 hours they were dedicated to FedEx. Outside of these hours, drivers could
use the trucks for other purposes so long as they removed or covered all FedEx markings.
FHD, 563 F.3d 492.
153 The drivers’ pay formula also suggested they produced delivery services in a
firm, not a market. The formula was based primarily on the time drivers committed to
FedEx, not by project. It included seniority bonuses. FedEx also paid bonuses based on
the collective performance of workers at a terminal. Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557.
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theory as a market. A decision to cancel a driver’s automatic contract renewal became an ex ante decision not to contract in the
market, a decision not to engage in, “repeat business.” 154 Returning
the example regarding the driver promotions to oversee more than
one route, FedEx, not the price mechanism, is directing resources
in production. The drivers’ so-called “business expansion,” looks
very much like a firm’s promotion of a driver up the internal job
ladder. FedEx is coordinating hierarchical relations in production.
FedEx and the IC decisions, however, suggested the decentralized
market conferred the opportunity, rather than FedEx.
2. Shift Replacements or Entrepreneurialism?
FedEx and the IC decisions engaged the ambiguity between
contracting and producing not only to redefine relations between
FedEx and each driver, but also to redefine relations among drivers. In doing so, it dissolved the FedEx bureaucracy into a nexus of
contracts. Multilateral cooperation among coworkers in production
merged into bilateral relations between contracting parties in the
market.
FedEx and the courts ruling in its favor argued that the drivers
were entrepreneurs, because they could “hire” others to perform
their work for them. Drivers could take advantage of expanding
business volume on their routes by hiring multiple drivers or decide not to work at all. The courts and FedEx contended the latter
was “not involved” in any of these transactions between one driver
and another. 155 However, any replacement and extra drivers must
already have formed a work relationship with FedEx: they must
undergo the required orientation, drug screening, road test, and
agree to follow all the rules in the written agreement. Moreover,
FedEx could still disapprove of anyone a driver wanted to hire. 156
In other words, drivers could “hire” their coworkers.
Unsurprisingly, drivers usually used replacements when they
needed a day off for illness or another reason. Or, they rented an
extra truck and used one of FedEx’s temporary drivers during the
154 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 595 (quoting Home Design, Inc. v. Kansas
Dep’t of Human Res., 27 Kan.App.2d 242, 247(2000).
155
156
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holiday season, when they needed the help to complete their assigned deliveries. This looks very much like having a coworker
cover a shift for you, or getting a coworker to help you with your
assigned work. However, the courts ruling for FedEx reinterpreted
the company’s centralized control over a complex division of labor
in production as the drivers bargaining with one another in the
market. 157 Multilateral cooperation among drivers, as they worked
under FedEx’s supervision and control, became bilateral contracts
between drivers in a decentralized market. Producing became contracting, and the fiat of the entrepreneur became the price mechanism.
Through the interpretation of shift replacements as incidents of
contracting rather than producing, the MDL court also negated another factor probative of employment under the applicable legal
test: the extent of the putative employer’s control over the worker’s
schedule. Judge Miller acknowledged that FedEx tightly controlled
drivers’ schedules. Drivers had to arrive within a certain window
in the morning—after the packages became available but early
enough to complete the 9.5-11 hours of work FedEx assigned per
day. They had to complete deliveries by a certain time in the evening and meet windows negotiated by FedEx for certain customers.
Judge Miller argued, however, “Contractors’ ability to hire assistants and replacement drivers, though, even under FedEx’s approval requirements, allows them to have complete freedom in their
schedules.” 158
3. From Firm to Market, From Bureaucracy to Nexus of Contracts
In fact, Judge Miller took the interpretation of shift replacements as an incidence of bargaining in the market rather than producing within a firm to a nonsensical extreme. The judge argued
that FedEx indeed controlled and monitored virtually every detail
of the drivers’ work, from their schedules to their appearance to
how they drove, kept records, handled packages, and interacted
with customers. He noted that all of this normally would be evidence of employment under the governing legal test. But, he ar157
158

Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 591 (emphasis added).
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gued that here, it was not, because the drivers were not “personally” subject to any of these controls: FedEx controlled the positions
but not the drivers. 159
This is the very definition of bureaucracy. The FedEx enterprise resembled not just any firm as might be faintly adumbrated
by economic theory: it resembled the consummate firm—a bureaucracy as conceptualized by Max Weber. 160 The more the allocation, pacing, and direction of the work, as well as the skill and
knowledge of the work, is embedded in the machine 161 —here the
FedEx logistics system, and the more closely it’s monitored, the
more indifferent the firm becomes to whether it’s Mary or Lee sitting in the delivery truck. The drivers are interchangeable. But this
separation of the person from the position reveals a bureaucracy—
the consummate expression of a firm. 162
Another dimension of the tension between master-servant status relations and contract comes to the fore here: As a masterservant relationship, employment is personal. As a contract, it is
impersonal and presumably assignable. Here the court construes
the fungibility of drivers as evidence that the relationship is impersonal—the kind of arms-length relationship found in the market.
The drivers’ interchangeability among standardized routines in a
tightly integrated operation becomes evidence of FedEx’s lack of
control over their work. 163
This exploitation of the tension between master-servant authority and contract not only redefines a firm as a market, but
thwarts the policy purposes of collective bargaining and minimum
wage law: The impersonality of bureaucracy—its indifference to
the personal characteristics of those filling its slots—was possible
precisely because the drivers were interchangeable, low-skilled
workers. The very evidence that suggested their status as workers
with little bargaining power—workers within the contemplated
159

Id. at 596.
MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETATIVE
SOCIOLOGY 988 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922).
161 Id. at 1395.
162 Id. at 218-19.
163 Another dimension of the tension between master-servant status relations and
contract comes to the fore here: As a master-servant relationship, employment is personal. As a contract, it is impersonal and presumably assignable. Here the court construes the
fungibility of drivers as evidence that the relationship is impersonal—the kind of armslength relationship found in the market.
160
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scope of the NLRA and minimum wage and hour law—became
evidence of independent contracting. The drivers’ fungibility, their
disposability, became evidence of their autonomy. The more that
drivers were “small cog[s] in a ceaselessly moving mechanism
which prescribes…an essentially fixed route of march,” 164 the
more they looked like entrepreneurs. 165
Judge Miller’s association of driver autonomy with FedEx’s
purported indifference to who drove its trucks is belied also by
FedEx’s bodily inspection of drivers. Drivers had to submit to
physical invasions not associated with civilian independent contracting—periodic drug screenings and physical examinations, and
for some drivers, strength tests. These criteria for the job, as well
as the driving record and criminal background check, could not be
assigned from one body to another.
The IC decisions evoke Weber’s comment about capitalist
work:
The private enterprise system transforms into objects of ‘labor
market transactions’ even those personal and authoritarianhierarchical relations which actually exist in the capitalist enterprise. While the authoritarian relationships are thus drained
of all normal sentimental content, authoritarian constraint not
only continues but, at least under certain circumstances, even
increases. 166
164

Id.
Unsurprisingly, the case records reveal few scant instances where drivers availed
themselves of the fabled entrepreneurial opportunity. In FHD, only one driver—a multiple-route driver—used his truck for a commercial purpose apart from serving FedEx.
Three out of thirty-three drivers held multiple-routes, and two of these drivers relied on
spouses to help with delivery volume. Not a single driver hired a full-time substitute.
Drivers used substitute drivers only for illness or vacation. Further they usually selected
substitute and extra drivers from a pool of replacement drivers FedEx made available for
that purpose.
The MDL record indicated that drivers rarely hired full-time substitutes or supplemental drivers. Shift replacements appeared to cost drivers money rather than increase
their earnings. See Greenhouse, supra note _. It is unclear the extent to which drivers at
other terminals created independent businesses, but evidence is sparse. Foust 2005;
Wishnia 2012; Grella 2009; Greenhouse, supra note _.
Regardless, the IC decisions are unable to explain why these opportunities are “entrepreneurial,” and not those available to a resourceful and smart employee.
166 WEBER, supra note _, at 731.
165
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The courts conflate the depersonalization of bureaucratic domination with the purported impersonality and autonomy of the market.
4. The Legitimacy of the Firm
Classic theories of the firm have not always explained firm
boundaries very well. 167 Financialization, globalization, technological advances, and other economic changes often uncouple governance types from their theorized costs and advantages. The theories
have not provided a refutable explanation for today’s buyer-driven
supply chains, for example. 168 These tend to centralize decisionmaking across firms. Other forms of production decentralize decision-making within firms. Classic theories of the firm tend to share
the major flaw of assuming that the boundaries of the business
form will coincide with the boundaries of the productive enterprise. The FedEx cases present another counterexample.
Nonetheless, in trying to provide an account for the firm’s existence, theories of the firm also, implicitly, provide a legitimating
account of the firm as a business form. Classic theories of the firm,
like those expostulated by Coase and Williamson, ground the social legitimacy of the corporation in the production of goods and
services: The warrant for the corporation is its ongoing coordination of a productive enterprise. In this regard, classic theories of
the firm stand in counterpoise to theories that promote the corpora167 For instance, Williamson’s theory that differences between contracting and agency costs could explain make or buy decisions did not explain mergers and acquisitions in
the 1980s. Charles Perrow, Economic Theories of Organization, 15 THEORY & SOC’Y 11
(1986).
168 Non-property relations do not necessarily impose greater information costs than
firms today. Communications and logistics technology have improved information flow
across proprietary firm boundaries. Advanced technology also helps to reduce the metering of individual productivity across property lines in buyer-driven supply chains. Further, market position enables powerful buyer-firms to avoid the trade-off between control
and the risk of decreases in product demand. Wal-Mart controls suppliers via its monopsony position. The company wants a flexible relationship with supplier firms akin to atwill employment. It uses market power rather than property ownership and employment
to achieve this control. By de-integrating or refusing to integrate, large downstream firms
can avoid liability, public scrutiny, and do not have to buy or maintain costly plant and
equipment. See also Mark Granovetter. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. OF SOC. 481 (1985).
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tion as a “nexus of contracts,” a “bundle of assets,” or a tool for
financial speculation, accounting manipulation, and regulatory
evasion. 169 As FedEx and the courts redefine the distinction between firms and markets, they redefine the appropriate relationship
between the corporate form and the productive enterprise. 170
In trying to explain the existence of firms, theories of the firm
implicitly provide a legitimating account of the business form.
Classic theories of the firm, like those expostulated by Coase and
Williamson, grounded the social legitimacy of the corporation in
the efficient production of goods and services. In redefining the
FedEx work relationship as market production rather than firm
production, the IC decisions reject this conception. They find company with those promoting the corporation as a tool for financial
speculation, accounting manipulation, and regulatory evasion.
5. Technology and Service Work
Advances in technology and distinctions between service work
and industrial manufacturing are two sources of institutional disruption in contemporary work relations. This section hypothesizes
that these contributed to making salient the ambiguity between
bargaining and producing in the FedEx disputes.
The FedEx bureaucracy is relatively invisible compared to the
bureaucracy of an industrial manufacturing enterprise. The advanced logistics and communications technology that FedEx uses
replaces the heavy integrated machinery and constant eye of the
169 Paul DiMaggio, Introduction: Making Sense of the Contemporary Firm and Prefiguring Its Future, in THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2011). GERALD F.
DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA (2009). Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Scholars generally use
“nexus of contracts” as a theory of firm ownership and control, a hypothesis about relationships among owners, financiers, and management, rather than relationships among
workers and management. Id. The article suggests, however, that the IC decisions offer a
nexus of contracts theory of the firm based on relationships between workers and management.
170 See e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). See also ROY, supra note _ (refuting Chandler’s efficiency theory as explanation for rise of large, integrated firms in the United
States); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
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foreman typical of industrial manufacturing. FedEx organizes, directs, and paces the work largely through the former. For instance,
barcode technology enables FedEx to monitor drivers’ locations
and delivery times. The control is relatively invisible.
Distinctions between industrial manufacturing and service
work may also have played a role. The production of FedEx delivery services takes place not in a factory, and not only in FedEx
terminals, but along thousands of miles of roads, and in the doorways of millions of residences and businesses. Production and consumption occur simultaneously in service work (i.e., the delivery
driver produces the service as the costumer consumes it).
FedEx did not accomplish its direction of resources through
gears and conveyer belts in a factory. It accomplished its fiat, its
centralized control over a multilateral division of labor in production, through logistics and communications technology, and over
an enormous geographic space not dedicated to FedEx production
alone. To the IC courts, the FedEx bureaucracy appeared as a nexus of bilateral contracts among drivers in a sprawling market.
It is unlikely that any court would find that pre-specifying and
embedding the work process in machinery is evidence of independent contracting—evidence that the alleged employer is not
controlling the means of the work. However, the IC decisions, particularly Judge Miller, fail to appreciate the logistics machine of
FedEx. FedEx’s control over drivers through sophisticated technology appeared as freedom.
6. Institutional Work: Contract as Bilateral, Direct, and Exclusive
To flatten the FedEx bureaucracy into a “nexus of contracts,” 171 the IC decisions perform institutional work. In particular, the decisions invoked an institutional features associated with
contract relations: the contract as a bilateral, direct, and exclusive
relationship. For instance the FHD majority emphasized that FedEx was not involved in the relationship between drivers and substitutes, extra drivers, and helpers: “[C]ontractors have the ability to

171 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983); DAVIS, supra note _.
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hire others without FedEx’s participation,” 172 and “substitutes and
helpers have been hired without FedEx’s involvement.” 173 The IC
decisions also characterized the promoted driver’s supervision of
other FedEx drivers as a distinct employment relationship in which
FedEx was uninvolved.
By emphasizing the contract as direct, bilateral, and exclusive,
the courts transformed multilateral relations among coworkers in
the productive process into bilateral contracts in the market. The
work of FedEx drivers is deeply embedded in a logistics system
and managerial hierarchy as imperious as the assembly line of an
industrial firm. However, by constructing the relationships among
drivers as contractual relations that excluded FedEx, the decisions
seem to make the FedEx logistics machine and bureaucracy disappear. In rendering the integrated enterprise of FedEx largely invisible, this institutional work created the illusion of independent business activity among drivers. 174
V. CONTRACTUAL ENDS OR THE MANNER OF PERFORMANCE?
This section examines how the IC decisions dealt with the second interpretative ambiguity in the employment contract identified
in Part II—the ambiguity between contractual duties and the way
they are performed. It shows that this ambiguity, like the ambiguity
between the activities of bargaining and producing, created discord
among courts considering the employment status of FedEx drivers.
It also shows another way in which the IC decisions constructed
the written contract as a marker of non-employment, 175 apart from

172

FHD, 563 F.3d at 502.
Id. at 503.
174 A driver’s permission to sell a route to another FedEx driver provided opportunity to profit, albeit in a one-time sell, for a few drivers. In the FedEx Home Delivery dispute, most new drivers received routes for free from FedEx, limiting the emergence of a
viable secondary market in FedEx jobs. FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006. Most who
quit their positions at FedEx did not sell their routes, and terminated drivers were not
allowed to sell them. Id. There is no evidence in any of the case records that any FedEx
driver created a business model out of trading FedEx jobs. It is also unclear why permission to sell one’s job is evidence that the position affords entrepreneurial opportunity.
175 For a more detailed discussion of how this ambiguity engenders inconsistency in
legal disputes over employment status, see Julia Tomassetti, The Contracting/Producing
Ambiguity and the Collapse of the Means/ends Distinction in Employment, 66 S.C. L.
Rev. 315 (2014).
173
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positioning it as a temporal barrier between bargaining and producing.
As explained in Part II, the law’s attempt to assimilate masterservant relations to contract produced a peculiar kind of contract in
employment. Unlike other contracts, the employment contract gave
one party a right to determine how the other party performed its
contractual duties. The means-ends standard for employment status
thus asks whether one party has a right to determine not only the
contracted-for ends of the deal, but also the “means” of performing
them. Parties may flex their muscles to insist that their contract include certain obligations. Yet neither has a right to control how the
other performs those obligations. Distinguishing employment from
independent contracting therefore depends on being able to distinguish between contractual duties and the manner of their performance, in order to evaluate whether one party is controlling the
latter, or just the former. As explained in Part II, the problem is
that the fusion of master-servant authority with contract makes the
distinction between contractual duties and how they are performed.
The employment contract collapses contractual formation and performance. The employer and employee do not consummate a contractual bargain and then proceed to perform it.
This conundrum puts the written agreement in an ambiguous
position in employment status disputes. It permits two possible interpretations: (1) Does anything stated in a written agreement necessarily refer to a contractual obligation and not the manner of satisfying it? Therefore, if the alleged employer is not telling workers
to do anything that is not in the contract, is it not controlling the
work? Likewise, if the alleged employer is closely supervises the
work, but only to ensure workers conform to contractual specifications, is it not controlling the work? (2) By contrast, are some
things stated in the contract not really contractual duties—do they
actually give one party has a right to determine how the other performs contractual duties or collapse the distinction?
The IC decisions take the first approach with respect to the
Operating Agreement (OA) drivers signed with FedEx. Judge Miller and the D.C. Circuit find that anything stated in the written contract was a contractual duty, by virtue of its expression there. The
written contract could not give one party has a right to control how
the other performs a contractual duty. Therefore, because FedEx
was not supervising and directing the work in any way that was
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inconsistent with or extraneous to the written contract, it was not
their employer: it was not telling the drivers how to perform their
contractual obligations, because these were the contractual obligations. The long, detailed OA (over seventy pages) purportedly exhausted FedEx’s authority over drivers and described their relationship ex ante with reasonable certainty. The document drivers
signed became an institutional marker of non-employment: it
formed a firewall between producing and contracting, protecting
the latter from contaminating the former, as it does in employment.
For example, Judge Miller repeatedly implied that the extensive elaboration of work in the OA established the precise bounds
of FedEx’s authority, and its lack of interest in controlling the
work during production. 176 He acknowledges that “[v]arious provisions of the Operating Agreement authorize FedEx to control the
days of service, the contractor’s daily workload, and certain time
windows when pick-ups and deliveries must be made. These requirements weigh in favor of employee status….” He continues,
however, by arguing that these requirements “are more suggestive
of a results-oriented approach to management when viewed with
the totality of circumstances. FedEx has contracted for the performance of certain work and has the right to require that the work be
completed as agreed.” 177
Both Judge Miller and the D.C. Circuit suggested that any supervision of the drivers to ensure that they were complying with
specifications in the OA could not be evidence of employment: the
company was not exercising extra-contractual discretion. FHD also
interpreted the five-day workweek of industrial employment as
more consistent with independent contracting than employment. It
argued that FedEx did not control the means of the work, since “it
is undisputed the contractors are only obligated to provide service
five days a week.” 178 Judge Miller also characterized features of
the work typical of industrial employment as contractual undertakings by FedEx. Thus, required training was not weighty evidence
of employment status, because the written agreement required
FedEx to “familiarize” drivers with the service they would pro-

176

See also supra Part IV.D.
Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 589.
178 FHD, 563 F.3d at 499 (emphasis added).
177
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vide. 179 Also, with respect to assigning drivers 9-11 hours of work
per day, five days a week, “FedEx is required to fulfill this obligation pursuant to the parties’ agreement, so it isn’t necessarily indicative of employee status.” 180
Likewise, the DC Circuit suggested that many work rules prespecified in the OA were not in this instance evidence of employment, because they were contractual obligations that described the
service the drivers agreed to provide. The court acknowledged that
in other delivery driver cases, including prior cases involving FedEx drivers, judges found certain features of work relevant to the
question of employment status—rules regarding training, insurance, uniforms, grooming standards, vehicles, performance bonuses, the inability to turn down assignments, and the five-day workweek. The majority argued that, in this case, however, “those distinctions, though not irrelevant, reflect differences in the type of
service the contractors are providing rather than differences in the
employment relationship.” 181
The most extreme example of using the ambiguity between
contractual duties and their performance to negate evidence of employment under the legal tests involved Judge Miller’s interpretation of the drivers’ right to quit in the written contract. The judge
noted that FedEx assigned each driver 9-11 hours of package deliveries per day, and that drivers had to delivery every package assigned to them that day. He acknowledged, “Requiring workers to
accept assigned work weighs in favor of employee status.”182
However, he claimed, “contractors can terminate their contracts
upon thirty days’ notice, in which case, they would be relieved of
any future work assignments.” The right to quit is evidence that the
drivers are employees under the governing legal tests. By default,
an employee can quit without incurring contractual liability. Because the OA states the driver’s at-will right, however (modified
only with a notice requirement), the court interprets it to negate not
only this evidence of employment status, but also the evidence that
FedEx has a right to assign daily workloads.
179 Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006, at *6 (E.D. Mo.
2013) (citing Operating Agreement drivers signed).
180 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 590.
181 FHD, 563 F.3d at 501.
182 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 590.
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Other courts considering the employment status of FedEx drivers differed in resolving the ambiguity between contractual duties
and their manner of performance. The 9th Circuit, for example,
found that the OA was not limited to stating only the results of the
work, but that the agreement gave FedEx the (non-contract-like)
right to control the drivers’ work. 183
From a doctrinal perspective grounded in the distinction between a contract and a master-servant relationship, the IC decisions
are incorrect in their interpretation of the written document drivers
signed. The OA does not specify the essential details of the bargain
or limit the discretion of FedEx production. It reads much like a
master-servant relationship. Some of its provisions nearly recite
the legal definition of employment. For example, drivers agree to
follow supervisory instructions (“cooperate with” FedEx employees). Some expressly give FedEx a right to determine the terms and
conditions of work during the course of the work. For instance,
drivers agree to follow whatever appearance and grooming standards FedEx might promulgate from “time to time,” and to service a
route as changed by FedEx from “time to time.” Some provisions
contemplate that FedEx will exercise ongoing discretion in its direction and supervision of the work. For example, drivers must
complete work assigned daily.
Some of the contractual terms the IC decisions cite as evidence
of the drivers’ entrepreneurial opportunity are actually evidence of
employment. Take the example of route assignments and daily assigned work. FedEx and the IC decisions contend that route assignments are evidence of entrepreneurial opportunity, because
drivers could negotiate for a good route and had contracted-for
property rights in their routes. Yet, FedEx did not commit contractually to a route assignment, however. It reserved the right to
change a driver’s service area unilaterally, upon a few days of notice. 184 Further, drivers agree to deliver packages outside their service areas and to relinquish deliveries in their service areas to other
drivers “as requested” by management. Drivers agreed to perform
183 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“What matters is what the contract, in actual effect, allows or requires”) (emphasis added). See also Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir.
2014).
184 See, e.g., Coase, supra note _, at _ (entrepreneur’s preference for avoiding ex
ante specification of significant details of the relationship favors firm production).
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whatever work FedEx required each day. Judge Miller admitted as
much, noting, “FedEx drivers typically are required to flex packages. Flexing is the daily expansion or contraction of a drivers’
work area.” 185 He likewise acknowledged that payment was based
on “expected daily work hours,” 186 and that FedEx had authority to
determine the days drivers must work. 187
All of these contractual “ends” leave it up to FedEx to determine the quantity of work the drivers will actually provide and
what they will earn for it. The terms reveal that the negotiation
process regarding the drivers’ services does not end upon signing
the agreement. The drivers and FedEx never arrive at an agreement
regarding the essential terms of a contractual bargain.
The contract did not limit FedEx’s discretion; it simply deemed
every exercise of discretion resembling the traditional prerogatives
of an employer as consistent with the contract and an exercise of
contract enforcement. While FedEx claimed that it could terminate
a contract only upon a driver’s breach, it reserved the authority to
interpret whether drivers’ satisfactorily complied with the agreement. 188
Many of the work rules the drivers contracted to follow required interpretation and implementation by supervisors. The
“Standard of Service” the drivers agree to provide—the supposed
“ends” of the work—is stated in broad terms that managers must
fill out during the course of the work. To do so, managers used
think manuals full of detailed policies that were generally unavailable to drivers. Managers also had discretion regarding what alleged breaches of the OA to document in drivers’ files. Drivers had
recourse to arbitration only after termination. While the OA required FedEx to give notice before terminating a driver, it could
suspend a driver without notice. 189

185

Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 569.
Id. at 568.
187 Id. See also id. at 589 (“Various provisions of the Operating Agreement authorize
FedEx to control the days of service, the contractor's daily workload, and certain time
windows when pick-ups and deliveries must be made.”)
188 Estrada at 334.
189 In one decision, Judge Miller cited nine instances where Michigan terminal managers threatened to refuse bonus payments or terminate drivers for rule violations. In re
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 273 F.R.D. 499 (N.D. Ind. 2010).
186
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Another court ruling on the drivers’ employment status recognized the quantum dimension of the drivers’ supposed contractual
duties, arguing that the “right to interpret the OA and the other
matters is in the sole hands of [FedEx]. By leaving such subjective
interpretation to the discretion of management, the relationship between the [drivers] and [FedEx] ceases to be a partnership, metamorphasizing into a tightly controlled hierarchical employment
model.” 190 In sum, the “OA is a brilliantly drafted contract creating
the constraints of an employment relationship with [single-route
drivers] in the guise of an independent contractor model.”191
Where the IC decisions saw a congeries of equal parties in the
market, this court saw a model of rational bureaucracy:
[The] lack of objective, precisely defined guidelines either reflects a totally disorganized business, which [FedEx] is certainly not, or a highly motivated, well organized entity, which it is,
that utilizes control and order in order to meet its successful
economic goals. 192
We think of contracts as delineating discrete obligations between two parties. 193 The FedEx contract, however, appears to describe the enterprise organization. The contract pre-specifies the
work a little like an engineering blueprint. Its work directives deposit the drivers into a highly rationalized, tightly integrated productive process controlled from the top. 194

190

Estrada trial ct. 2004, at *5.
Id. at *3.
192 Id. at *6. The Kansas Supreme Court and 9th Circuit also interpret the significance of these contractual provisions in the opposite manner of the IC decisions. They
suggest that an employer cannot transform the means of work into the ends of work
merely by stating so in its contract.
193 See Judy Fudge, Fragmenting Work and Fragmenting Organizations: The Contract of Employment and the Scope of Labour Regulation, 44 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 609
(2006); Judy Fudge, The Legal Boundaries of the Employer, Precarious Workers, and
Labour Protection, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW: GOALS AND MEANS
IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 295 (Guy Davidov and Brian Langille eds., 2006); see also
FREEDLAND, supra note _, at 36-52.
194 Even if many rules in the contract provide meaningful guidance, some courts still
resist interpreting everything in the contract as a description of the ends of the work.
Courts have been unwilling to construe rules involving uniforms, grooming, demeanor,
and work schedules as consistent with independent contracting. See, e.g., Alexander.
191
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The following thought experiment seeks to illustrate how the
interpretative ambiguities in employment make it possible for
judges to reinterpret even traditional employment as independent
contracting. 195 It is also meant to illustrate the potential role of
technology and service work in shaping the IC decisions—they
make it easier to disguise the FedEx bureaucracy as a nexus of
contracts in the market. Finally, the though experiment is meant to
reveal how distant the image of the firm constructed in the IC decisions is from the firm as conceptualized by classic theories of the
firm:
•

•

•

195

You contract with the firm for a “proprietary right” to your
assembly line workstation. You are responsible for rotating
and inserting pins inside each widget that comes down the
conveyor belt in a day. You have no set schedule, but the
firm turns on machine at 7:30 am so you cannot begin before that. You can take breaks when you want, but the engineers control the speed of the machinery, and they have
estimated how long it takes you to grab the widget, turn
your wrist, pick up a pin, and insert it, and thus you will
have 9.5-11 hours of work per day. You must work so as
not to hold up the next station. We turn the machine off at
5:30 pm.
You have entrepreneurial opportunity: You receive payment per each widget and pin, and depending on our customer demand, the machine will speed up and send more
pins down per day. If it looks like you are falling behind,
we will give some of your work to a coworker or install an
automated widget rotator that will decrease your pay. But,
we give you five days to present a plan to us showing how
you can take advantage of this increased “business volume”
by finding a coworker to help hand you the pins or purchasing an expensive widget rotator.
You also “invest” in your business/workstation, because
you are responsible for paying for the oil to keep that part
of the conveyor belt moving. As long as all these implements meet the particular specifications we set, you can
I thank Larry Solum and Noah Zatz for suggesting this thought experiment.
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•

•

buy them anywhere. Thus, you have the entrepreneurial
opportunity to earn “profit” by finding cheap suppliers. 196
You can “hire” others to run your station, so long as they
are coworkers or workers who we have already agreed to
hire. You can expand your business if we allow you to
manage a group of stations and hire coworkers to run them.
A few times a year, a supervisor will stand next to you all
day. Otherwise, we do not supervise. We do monitor “customer service,” however, through sensors that measure
your speed and accuracy.
CONCLUSION

The paper posed the following question: how are courts able to
interpret what very much looks like a “typical” relationship between an employer and employee as a relationship between two
independent firms? The answer is that the employment contract
itself is contradictory. The law’s attempt to render master-servant
authority as a contract collapses the distinctions between contractual formation and performance, and, as a result, between the activities of bargaining and producing, and between the “ends” and
“means” of the work. It enables courts to negate the importance of,
or even reverse the meaning of, many of the factors probative of an
employment relationship under the legal tests for employment status. It enables courts to redefine features of industrial employment,
like the opportunity for a promotion or permission to have a
coworker cover a shift for you, into evidence of entrepreneurial
opportunity. It also destabilizes the distinction between firms and
markets.
In the past, many social actors participated in institutionalizing
employment as a somewhat intelligible relationship. They developed patterns of activity, media, norms, and organizations to represent employment in the industrial age. The institutional markers of
industrial employment bore no necessary relation to the “means”
or “ends” of the work, however. They were settlements. For a time,
they submerged, but did not ultimately resolve, the contradiction
196 FedEx had argued that drivers had entrepreneurial opportunity because they
could save money by locating cheap mechanics.
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between servitude and equality embedded within the employment
contract.
Today, the contradictory nature of capitalist work is reemerging. Several changes appear to be causing the institutional disruption: a movement among firms to shift risks to workers, a reorientation of the economy around financial markets putting ever more
pressure on profits, the growth of the service sector, and technological revolutions in logistics and communications. Institutional disruption forces judges to confront the contradictory complex of servitude and equality that defines employment. It prompts efforts to
reconcile the tension between servitude and equality by constructing new institutional features to mark an employment relationship.
FedEx reorganized many of the conventional, institutional
markers of industrial employment in the drivers’ work. These were
markers that had purported to separate contractual formation from
performance in employment. In an industrial manufacturing firm,
for example, human resources personnel might hire the worker and
explain salary and benefits. Later, distinct personnel in a manufacturing division will probably supervise the worker on the factory
floor. These organizational markers separated the productive process from the sorting of workers in the labor market and the contracting process. Courts differed on how to make sense of the FedEx disorganization and thus how to understand the drivers’ work
relationship with FedEx. In disorganizing these markers, FedEx
enabled the contradiction within employment between masterservant authority and contract to resurface. As courts contend with
the doctrinal manifestations of this contradiction, they work to reinstitutionalize employment as an intelligible relationship. The IC
decisions worked to re-institutionalize what looks much like what
scholars have referred to as standard employment—a direct, fulltime, long-term relationship between a worker and a large firm—as
one of independent entrepreneurialism. By drawing upon the ambiguities embedded within the legal definition of employment, they
transform employment into independent contracting, a firm into a
market, and a bureaucracy into a nexus of contracts.
This paper elaborated on one aspect of the institutional work
that the IC decisions perform to reconstruct employment as a
meaningful relationship: the decisions construct the written agreement the drivers sign with FedEx as a marker of independent contracting. First, they deposited the written agreement as a temporal
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barrier between bargaining and producing. FedEx shifts the temporal site of the contract signing from its location in an industrial
employment arrangement to transform features of the relationship
that would ordinarily be evidence of employer control over the
“means” of the work into control over the “ends. Secondly, the IC
decisions draw on the ambiguity in employment between the articulation of contractual duties and how they are performed to construct the drivers’ written agreement as an institutional marker of
independent contracting. The IC courts maintain that the document
stated only the contractual ends of the drivers’ work, not its
means. 197 They suggest that such a lengthy contract must exhaust
FedEx’s authority over drivers. It signals that FedEx has not reserved the open-ended discretion in production that defines employment, that FedEx will not continue to bargain over the terms of
work during production. The ostensibly detailed, upfront elaboration of the work appears to establish and protects a sphere of independent production.
The contract has a double structure as an institutional marker.
On the one hand, it is an “extra-legal data” point. Judges are generally most comfortable with understanding their role as classificatory rather than constitutive. They would like employment to be a
social relationship that is already “out there,” which they then fit
within a legal category, not a relationship they create by legal fiat. 198 Thus, the contract has an extra-legal existence that judges
recognize. For instance, parties to not need to intend to create legal
relations to create an enforceable contract—they must intend to be
in a deal, however. 199 The contract also has a legal existence—it is
a template and regulatory structure for private exchanges. 200 Written documents purporting to be “contracts” do not necessarily meet
197
198

Zatz, Working at the Boundaries, supra note _, at 940.
See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. Ct. App. 1954).
200 Roland Barthes’ semiotics is helpful here. Barthes theorized the “sign” as a
“symbol” plus the “signified” thing. The written contract in these decisions works a like
Barthes’ double exposure or revolving door explanation of a “myth.” In the myth, the
signifier is a sign with a new signified. Here, the sign is the contract as legal template,
and by interposing the contract as an institutional marker, the arbitrariness of the association between the sign-as-signifier (contract as legal template) and new signified (nonemployment) is submerged in the association between the signified and signifier in the
sign. ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES (1972).
199
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the requirements of a binding legal contract. In the many disputes
over employment status, however, by assuming the trappings of a
legal template, the written agreement gains doctrinal and normative valence as a marker of non-employment.
If the legal tests are ambiguous, and if the very definition of
employment is contradictory, what was the basis for the author’s
critique of the IC decisions? The paper argued that the decisions
and their reasoning are wrong for reasons of doctrine, policy, and
the legitimacy of the business form.
First, many of the elements in the governing tests that the
courts either negate or even transform into evidence of independent contracting bear on what should be the ultimate doctrinal question: is the disputed relationship more like a contract or more like a
master-servant relationship?
Secondly, this difference is relevant to the premise of most
statutory work laws, including those at issue in the IC decisions—
the NLRA and wage and hour law. The premise of most statutory
employment protections is that a systematic disparity in bargaining
power between workers and employers warrants statutory intervention. To say that an employer has a “right” to control the work,
from the perspective of contract doctrine, is simply an observation
that the employer will tend to get its way in the continuing bargaining over the work, as the employer directs the work and the employee decides whether to quit or to follow the employer’s direction. It means the employer has enough power to determine unspecified, but significant, terms of the bargain as the work relationship proceeds. Thus, the right to assign daily work is evidence of
employment, because it indicates that one party has enough power
to determine the quantity of labor the worker must provide for a
given price. Several factors in the legal tests for employment status
are relevant to the doctrinal and policy questions, including skill
and the right to discipline the worker. They reflect whether one
party continues to “bargain” over the terms of the work, and get its
way, due to superior economic power. FHD and Judge Miller exploited the ambiguities in the employment contract to redefine control over production as equality in contracting.
For the same reasons, the paper is critical of the IC decision’s
construction of the written agreement the drivers sign as a marker
of non-employment. As an institutional marker, the written agreement purports to deconstruct the coincidence of domination in pro-
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duction and independence in contracting that defines employment.
This is, of course, what written contracts purport to do—separate
the process of contractual formation from performance. Not every
piece of paper with “agreement” on the front achieves this purpose,
however. The drivers’ agreement does not delimit separate moments of contracting and production and protect the latter from the
former. Rather than describe fixed obligations between FedEx and
each driver, the agreement deposits the drivers into a tightly integrated process of production controlled by FedEx. By its terms, the
agreement gives FedEx a right to determine the essential terms of
the bargain during the course of the work. The IC decisions allow
FedEx to use the written agreement to write around not only the
legal test for employment status, but also around the contractual
requirements of consideration and definiteness.
Finally, the paper suggested that the decisions rationalize a
corporation whose boundaries bear no relation to the efficient production of goods and services, but instead seem calculated to evade
statutory work protections.
Two modest changes in judges’ approach to employment status
disputes would improve decision-making and restrict the tendency
of judges hostile to statutory work protections. 201 The first is already at hand:
(1) Use contract law. In determining whether a relationship is
one of employment or independent contracting, the ultimate question courts are trying to get at is whether the relationship is more
like an employment relationship or a contract. What distinguishes
employment from other contracts involving acute power disparities
is not the lopsidedness of specified terms. Employment entails a
particular term giving one party open-ended authority. Courts
could use principles from contract law involving consideration,
definiteness, negotiation and closure, and good faith, to better get
201

The bifurcated analysis explained in the 3rd Restatement of Employment Law
would also much simplify and improve legal reasoning in employment status disputes.
The Restatement recommends first looking at whether the alleged employer closely supervises the physical details of work. This is sufficient, but not necessary, to establish
employment status. When the alleged employer does not exercise such control, which
could be the case in unskilled work where supervision is unnecessary or in the case of
certain professional employees like doctors, the court would looks to whether the alleged
employer’s control “effectively prevents the service provider from providing the services
as an independent businessperson. RESTATEMENT 3D. OF EMPLOYMENT (2015). Under the
Restatement, the FedEx drivers are clearly employees.
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at the distinction: Do the ex ante terms of the agreement include a
quantity term? Or is it more like a master-servant relationship,
where one party agrees to provide an indefinite amount of labor for
a definite payment? Are the essential terms of the bargain being
worked out in production? Is it an “agreement to agree” by design?
Does the agreement by its terms afford so much discretion to one
party that it could deprive the other of the benefit of the bargain?
As noted, several factors in the tests for employment status are relevant to distinguishing contracts from master-servant relations.
(2) Use principles from major economic theories of the firm. 202
In order for any test for employment status focusing on a worker’s
“entrepreneurial opportunity” to be useful, judges need some
means of distinguishing entrepreneurial opportunity—or opportunity conferred by the market—from the opportunity an employee
has within a firm. A firm theory approach might curb the tendency
of some courts to find workers to be independent contractors so
long as the workers retain a smidgen of discretion (which is always). For example, under a transaction cost approach considering
the trade-off between flexibility and control, a court would focus
on what calculability the alleged employer relinquished by turning
to the market, not on what discretion the worker retained. 203 This
approach would also direct courts to look at the broader matrix of
exchange and productive relations the parties inhabit: is there any
other buyer on the market for the putative contractor’s services, for
instance? If not, it is probably an employment relationship. Several
factors in the legal tests for employment status already bear on
whether the relationship more resembles firm production or market
production. 204
202 See Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 661 (2013)
203 California in effect incorporates the concept of “residual” cost from transaction
cost economics. This is the cost of lost calculability to the non-integrated from relinquishing some control over production. California’s agency test looks at whether the alleged
employer retained “all necessary control” for its purposes. S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t
of Indus.
Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 405 (Cal. 1989). This shifts the focus of the means-ends standard away from what discretion a worker retains and away from the intensity of work
monitoring. It centers the inquiry on whether the alleged employer supervises enough to
meet its goals. Under this test, workers engaged in simple manual tasks are generally
employees despite low levels of supervision.
204 Statutory reforms that include less open-ended definitions of employment and require courts to consider statutory purpose would also help. Judge Miller found that some

(continued next page)
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Both of these solutions are limited. The first is dependent on
the clarity of contract law. The second depends on our ability to
distinguish firms from markets. It is not likely to work well when
dealing with disputes over work arrangements less clear than the
FedEx relationship. Much innovative research on contemporary
arrangements for production rejects the firm-market binary. Firm
theory cannot be of much help then if employment law continues
to insist on an employment-independent contractor binary.
The provisional solutions also would not solve the problem of
ensuring that workers without employers could access rights and
benefits. Unlike the FedEx drivers, many workers do not have
clear employers that are capable of complying with the law. These
include day laborers, migrant farm workers, and some home health
aids. We need new governance solutions for these workers. 205
The provisional solutions elide another issue. Even if enforced
in full, the panoply of rights the law affords to workers are insufficient to curb a growing inequality, durable poverty, and other macroeconomic harms, or to ensure the individual has the opportunity
to flourish as befits a human being and citizen. A minimum wage,
for instance, is not a living wage.
Finally, the problem is not simply that some courts draw the
line between employment and other relationships in the “wrong”
place. The law’s attempt to render master-servant authority as a
contract creates challenges for all legal decision-makers, not just
those inclined to rule in the employer’s favor. The prescription to
draw from this article is not that we need a better method to draw a
dividing line. The institutions that generate the categories requiring
this bordering are flawed, and we need bigger fixes. Two goals
should be to improve worker bargaining power or the supply elasticity of labor 206 and to decommodify labor effort. 207 Only a radical
FedEx drivers were employees under state statutes with narrow exclusions for independent contractors. See Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 694-95. Some jurisdictions recognize a category of “dependent contractors.” Two other reforms would not depend on
judges’ aptitude in recognizing an employment relationship—increasing penalties and
improving enforcement of existing laws.
205 See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities
and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (2010); Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2010).
206 The first might entail providing opportunities for individuals to withdraw their
labor from the market when the price goes down, as do owners of other commodities.
Several policies and proposals tend to increase the elasticity of the supply of labor effort:
(continued next page)
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transformation in work relations will ultimately stabilize the legal
identity of contemporary work. The interpretative ambiguities that
result from trying to encase master-servant relations in contract are
a manifestation of a deeper conflict: our aspirations to be capitalist
yet democratic, to commodify human will but eschew human servitude, to reconcile liberty of contract with liberty of person.

living wages; expanded opportunities for education, re-skilling, child rearing, and selfsustenance; social drawing rights; and a minimum income. See SUPIOT REPORT.
207 An example would be to abolish employment and require that labor services be
sold through contracts. See also Sachs, supra note _, for other proposals that would help
restrict the exchange of human effort as a commodity.
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